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Sanctions, Countermeasures, and
the Iranian Nuclear Issue
N. Jansen Calamita*
ABSTRACT

The international community's response to Iran's nuclear
development program highlights the sometimes complex legal
relationship between the UN system of collective security and
the rights of states to take unilateralcountermeasures under the
law of state responsibility. It also raises a number of important
questions about (a) the discretion afforded to states in the
interpretation and implementation of Security Council
resolutions, (b) the availability of countermeasures for the
violation of multilateral obligations, and (c) the exclusivity of
the Chapter VII framework for collective security.
This Article argues that, while the Security Council's Iran
sanctions resolutions do not grant discretionary authority to
states to broaden the scope of the measures, states retain their
rights under the law of state responsibility to take unilateral
countermeasures in response to wrongful acts. Under the law of
state responsibility, multilateral treaties like the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) are best understood as integrated
agreements, such that in the event of non-compliance each State
Party is entitled to treat itself as an "injured State" for the
purposes of determining the availability of countermeasures.
Moreover, quite apart from the question of whether the NPT is

* University of Birmingham. The Author wishes to thank Robert Cryer, Nancy
Eisenhauer, and Antonios Tzanakopoulos for their generous suggestions on earlier
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an integrated agreement, there is a substantial body of state
practice supporting the right of states to take collective
countermeasures in response to violations of multilateral
obligations. The case for this entitlement is at its strongest
where, as in the situation with Iran, the wrongful conduct has
been determined by an internationalbody with responsibilityfor
monitoring and verifying compliance with the obligations in
question. In such instances, the use of countermeasures in
response to violations-farfrom undermining the international
order-may serve to promote respect for the internationalrule of
law.
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I. INTRODUCTION

For the past seven years, the international community has been
unable to resolve concerns raised by Iran's program of nuclear
development. Throughout this period, Iran has maintained that its
development of nuclear technology is purely for civilian use and,
therefore, permitted under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which guarantees the "inalienable right" of
all States Parties to develop, research, and produce nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes.1 As part of its NPT obligations, 2 however, Iran
is also party to a comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),3 the international body
that monitors nuclear activity and supervises compliance with
safeguards obligations under the NPT. 4 Under the Agreement, Iran
is obligated to ensure the transparency of its nuclear program and
allow for independent verification that nuclear materials are not
being diverted to military applications. 5 Iran, however, has not been

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons art. IV(1), opened for
1.
signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
2.
See id. art. 111(1) (requiring states party to negotiate and conclude a
safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency "for the exclusive
purpose of verification of the fulfilment [sic] of its obligations assumed under this
Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices").
3.
Agreement Between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency for
the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, June 19, 1973, reprinted in Int'l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA],
The Text of the Agreement and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards In
Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, at 2, IAEA
Doc. INFCIRC/214 (Dec. 13, 1974) [hereinafter Iran Safeguards Agreement].
4.
See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, art.
III(1) (noting that all states party will accept safeguards under the International
Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system).
5.
Iran Safeguards Agreement, supra note 3, arts. 7(a)-(b), 31, 32.
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transparent about its nuclear program, and the IAEA has been
unable to confirm the peaceful character of Iran's nuclear activities. 6
As a result, international concern about Iran's nuclear aspirations
has not abated.
Since the first revelations of Iran's nuclear development program
in 2002, various steps have been taken as part of an international
effort to confirm Iran's assertions of peaceful intentions and to
persuade Iran to halt all of its nuclear development activity until an
independent verification has been made. In particular, there have
been intensified inspections of Iran's facilities by the IAEA and
repeated multilateral negotiations offering Iran economic and trade
incentives to suspend enrichment activity. 7 Further, the issue has
been referred to the United Nations Security Council, and targeted
sanctions have been imposed against Iran under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter.8 To date, none of these efforts have succeeded in either
confirming the peaceful character of Iran's nuclear program or
persuading Iran to halt further development. Indeed, Iran remains

6.
See IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant
Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and
1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report of the Director General, paras. 1724, IAEA Doc. GOV/2009/35 (June 5, 2009) [hereinafter IAEA Director General June
2009 Report].
Contrary to the request of the Board of Governors and the requirements of the
Security Council, Iran has neither implemented the Additional Protocol nor
cooperated with the Agency in connection with the remaining issues which give
rise to concerns and which need to be clarified to exclude the possibility of
military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme.
Id.; IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions
of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008)
in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report of the Director General, paras. 15-23, IAEA Doc.
GOV/2009/8 (Feb. 19, 2009) [hereinafter LAEA Director General February 2009 Report]
('Jnless Iran implements the above transparency measures and the Additional
Protocol, as required by the Security Council, the Agency will not be in a position to
provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and
activities in Iran.").
7.
Indeed, as this Article goes to press, the international community is once
again negotiating with Iran about its nuclear program, seeking to persuade Iran to
abandon its nuclear ambitions in exchange for economic and trade incentives. See Marc
Champion & Jay Solomon, Iran Agrees to Transfer Uranium Abroad, WALL ST. J., Oct.
2, 2009, at Al (describing the results of this first round of new negotiations, the most
important of which was an agreement by Iran "to transfer the bulk of its known
nuclear fuel to other countries to enrich it"). Whether these talks will prove any more
fruitful than the failed 2003 negotiations remains to be seen. See infra Part II for a
discussion of failed attempts to deal with Iran's nuclear ambitions between 2002 and
2006.
8.
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1803,
3, 5, 7-11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1803 (Mar. 3, 2008)
(imposing further sanctions against Iran for its lack of cooperation with the IAEA and
refusal to suspend its enrichment and reprocessing activities).
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in breach of the Security Council's decisions and its obligations under
the NPT.9
In addition to these multilateral efforts, the United States and
certain European states have taken unilateral measures against Iran
in response to its continued non-compliance with its NPT obligations.
In some cases, these measures have been in the nature of retorsions
(i.e., unfriendly yet otherwise legal acts meant to signal disapproval
of Iran's recalcitrance). 10 In other cases, the measures go beyond
mere expressions of disapproval and involve the suspension of the
performance of international legal obligations otherwise owed to
Iran.11 Over the past year, particularly in response to the September
25, 2009 revelation of yet another previously undisclosed uranium
enrichment facility in (Qom) Iran, 12 news reports have indicated that
these states are considering the adoption of still further non-forcible
unilateral measures against Iran-perhaps based upon a new,
broader interpretation of existing Security Council resolutionspossibly as countermeasures outside of the UN Chapter VII
framework. 13 Recent reports have suggested that, in the face of

9.
LAEA Director General June 2009 Report, supra note 6, paras. 17-23
(outlining various violations of the NPT Safeguards Agreement by Iran and its refusal
to comply with the relevant provisions of the applicable Security Council resolutions);
IAEA Director General February 2009 Report, supra note 6, paras. 15-22 (noting Iran's
failure to comply with its obligations under the NPT Safeguards Agreement as well as
its noncompliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions).
10.
See, e.g., Executive Order 12959, 60 Fed. Reg. 24757 (May 9, 1995)
(Banning U.S. trade and investment in Iran and banning the import of Iranian goods
into the United States); see also Notice of March 8, 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 9897; Notice of
March 5, 1997, 62 Fed. Reg. 10409; Notice of March 4, 1998, 63 Fed. Reg. 11099; Notice
of March 10, 1999, 64 Fed. Reg. 12239; Notice of March 13, 2000, 65 Fed. Reg. 13683;
Notice of March 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 15013; Notice of March 13, 2002, 67 Fed. Reg.
1153; Notice of March 12, 2003, 68 Fed. Reg. 12563; Notice of March 10, 2004, 69 Fed.
Reg. 12051; Notice of March 10, 2005, 70 Fed. Reg. 12581; Notice of March 13, 2006, 71
Fed. Reg. 13241; Notice of March 8, 2007, 72 Fed. Reg. 10883; Notice of March 11,
2008, 73 Fed. Reg. 13727; Notice of March 11, 2009,74 Fed. Reg 10999 (each Notice
serving as an annual renewal of the ban pursuant to the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-1706) and the National Emergencies Act (50
U.S.C. 1622(d)). Further examples of U.S. action against Iran which while in the
nature of restrictions do not violate international legal obligations owed by the United
States to Iran may be found in U.S. GEN'L ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IRAN SANCTIONS:
IMPACT IS UNCLEAR AND SHOULD BE EVALUATED, GAO-08-58 (Dec. 2007).
See, e.g., EU Imposes New Sanctions on Iran, BBC NEWS, June 23, 2008,
11.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/7469283.stm (reporting actions taken by the
European Union to freeze the assets of Bank Melli, Iran's largest bank); see also infra
text accompanying notes 58-60 (discussing the Common Position and subsequent
regulations adopted by the European Union on restrictive measures against Iran).
With respect to the United States, see, e.g., infra note 64.
Jonathan Weisman, Siobhan Gorman & Jay Solomon, West Raps Iran
12.
Nuclear Site, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2009, at Al.
See, e.g., Daniel Dombey & James Blitz, US and EU Plan Iran Sanctions,
13.
FIN. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2008, at 10 (reporting that the U.S. and allies are discussing
targeted sanctions against Iran's energy and financial sectors); Joe Lauria, Jay
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continued deadlock in the Security Council, 14 the United States and
its European allies are considering ways to bring further pressure to
15
bear on Iran in the event that the Security Council fails to do so.
The circumstances described highlight the sometimes complex
legal relationship between the UN system of collective security and
the rights of states to take countermeasures under the law of state
responsibility. They also raise a number of important questions
about (a) the discretion afforded to Member States in the
interpretation and implementation of Security Council resolutions;
(b) the availability of countermeasures for the violation of
multilateral obligations; and (c) the exclusivity of the Chapter VII
framework for collective security. In the first place, one must ask to
what extent states enjoy discretion in the interpretation and
implementation of the Council's sanctions resolutions, particularly
where the interpretation under consideration would provide a legal
justification for an otherwise wrongful act. Second, with respect to
the question of countermeasures, one must ask whether a breach of a
multilateral agreement like the NPT can serve as a justification for
the other States Parties to take countermeasures against the
responsible state. If the answer is that they may, then the question
arises whether a breach of a multilateral agreement can serve that
function, even in situations in which the Security Council has taken
action under Chapter VII to compel compliance from the nonperforming state.
The purpose of this Article is to discuss some of the legal issues
raised by the international community's ongoing efforts to find a
peaceful way to change Iranian behavior and bring the country back
into compliance with its non-proliferation obligations. Part II begins
by examining the legal aspects of Iran's nuclear development
program, tracking the IAEA's and the Security Council's
determinations on Iranian non-compliance with its NPT safeguards
obligations. Part II addresses the current UN sanctions regime and
examines the manner in which those resolutions should be

Solomon & Farnaz Fassihi, U.S., Allies Seek New Ways to Sanction Iran, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 30, 2009, at A6 ("The Obama administration and its Western allies are looking at
new ways to constrict Iran's energy, transportation and financial sectors in the wake of
last week's revelation that Tehran had secretly developed a second nuclear-fuel
facility."); Barak Ravid, U.S. Briefs Israel on New Iran Nuke Sanctions, HAARETZ (Isr.),
Aug. 3, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1104208.html (reporting that the
U.S. is in talks with Israel about the possibility of intensifying sanctions against Iran
by "aim[ing] to significantly curb Tehran's ability to import refined petroleum
products" ).
14.
See, e.g., Geoff Dyer, Daniel Dombey & Charles Clover, China Hostile to
Iran Sanctions, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2009, at 6 (describing Chinese hostility to further
Iran sanctions).
15.
Indeed, the European Union had already adopted a number of unilateral
non-forcible measures against Iranian interests without express Security Council
authorization.
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Part IV considers the general
interpreted and implemented.
availability of countermeasures for the violation of multilateral
obligations such as the NPT obligations. Finally, Part V takes up the
issue of whether countermeasures might be foreclosed, either as a
consequence of the structure of the NPT-IAEA system or because the
Security Council has become seized of the situation under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter.

II.

LEGAL ASPECTS OF IRAN'S NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

A. The Disclosure of Iran'sNuclear Programand
IranianNon-Compliance with its NPT Transparency
Obligations (2002-2005)
Although Article IV of the NPT establishes the "inalienable
right" of all States Parties to develop, research, and produce nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes, the NPT also requires each nonnuclear-weapon State Party to accept safeguards as set forth in a
safeguards agreement with the IAEA. 16 Each NPT safeguards

16.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, arts.
111(1), IV(4). The concept of "safeguards" pre-dates the NPT. Under the 1957 Statute of
the IAEA, states agreed to accept safeguards as a quid pro quo for IAEA assistance on
civilian nuclear projects to ensure that the materials and equipment used in those
projects were not diverted to use in nuclear weapons programs. Statute of the
International Atomic Energy Agency arts. III(A)(5), XI(F)(4), Oct. 26, 1956, 8 U.S.T.
1093, 276 U.N.T.S. 3. The Statute assigned the IAEA a dual mission: to promote the
development of atomic energy and to help ensure "that assistance provided by it or at
its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further
any military purpose." Id. art. II. In order for the Agency to carry out its mission, the
IAEA Statute authorizes the Agency to "apply safeguards" to nuclear materials in
conjunction with Agency projects, or otherwise at the request of one or more States. Id.
art. III(A)(5).
Pursuant to Article II of its Statute the Agency has the task of seeking 'to
accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and
prosperity throughout the world.' Inasmuch as the technology of nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes is closely coupled with that for the production of
materials for nuclear weapons, the same Article of the Statute provides that
the Agency 'shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at
its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to
further any military purpose.'
Id. IAEA, The Agency's Safeguards System (1965, As Provisionally Extended in 1966
and 1968), para. 1, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 (Sept. 16, 1968). Although Article
III(1) of the NPT refers to "the Agency's safeguards system," this was not intended to
mandate the application of the pre-NPT safeguards system in NPT States. Rather, "a
new system of safeguards, parallel to the existing one, had to be devised in order to
establish uniform rules applicable to the States Party to the NPT .. " 2 MOHAMED I.
SHAKER, THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: ORIGIN AND IMPLEMENTATION,
1959-1979, 679 (1980). Thus, there are two IAEA safeguards systems: the one that preexisted the NPT and a second which has developed under the terms of the NPT.
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agreement requires a state to accept IAEA safeguards on all source or
special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within
the territory of the state, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under
its control anywhere. 17 Safeguards agreements further require that
states establish and maintain a system to account for and control all
nuclear material subject to safeguards for the purpose of verifying
compliance with the safeguards obligations.1 " In addition, under the
Statute of the IAEA-to which all States Party to the NPT are also
parties-the IAEA Board of Governors is authorized to make findings
of non-compliance with respect to safeguards obligations and to direct
the non-complying state to remedy the breach. 19
In 2002, an Iranian dissident group raised public concern about
Iran's compliance with its NPT safeguards obligations by exposing
the existence of a uranium enrichment site at Natanz and the
construction of a heavy water plant at Arak-both of which, once
operational, would be capable of producing weapons-grade
plutonium. 20
While neither of these facilities violated Iran's
commitment not to make or acquire nuclear weapons, neither of them
had been declared by Iran to the IAEA as required under its NPT
Safeguards Agreement. 21
The subsequent discovery by IAEA
inspectors in 2002 and 2003 of additional undeclared nuclear
activities, including uranium enrichment and plutonium separation
efforts, 22 led IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei to conclude

17.
IAEA, The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and
States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, art. 1, IAEA Doc. Circular INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) (June 1972) [hereinafter
Model NPT Safeguards Agreement]. Accord Iran Safeguards Agreement, supra note 3,
art. 1 (mirroring the language of the first paragraph of the Model NPT Safeguards
Agreement).
18.
Model NPT Safeguards Agreement, supra note 17, art. 7. Accord Iran
Safeguards Agreement, supra note 3, art. 7 (closely tracking the language of the
seventh paragraph of the Model NPT Safeguards Agreement).
19.
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, supra note 16, art. XII.
20.
Alireza Jafarzadeh, U.S. Representative Office, Nat'l Council of Resistance
of Iran, New Information on Top Secret Projects of the Iranian Regime's Nuclear
Program (Aug. 14, 2002), http://www.iranwatch.org/privateviews/NCRI/perspex-ncritopsecretprojects-081402.htm. Shortly thereafter, Gholam Reza Aghazadeh, the
President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran at the time, confirmed that Iran
had decided to embark upon a long-term nuclear program. Gholam Reza Aghazadeh,
Vice-President, Islamic Republic of Iran, and President, Atomic Energy Org. of Iran,
Statement at the 46th General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(Sept. 16, 2002), http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC46/iran.pdf.
21.
See Iran Safeguards Agreement, supra note 3, arts. 7, 32, 34-38, 42-48
(providing for the establishment of safeguards for accounting for nuclear material,
establishing necessary capabilities of Iran's nuclear accounting system, requiring-with
exceptions-for Iran to report to the IAEA upon coming into possession of certain kinds
of nuclear material and requiring Iran to provide the IAEA with design information for
its existing nuclear facilities).
22.
See IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran: Resolution Adopted by the Board on 12 September 2003, pmbl., paras.
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in 2003 that "it is clear that Iran has failed in a number of instances
over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its
'23
Safeguards Agreement.
At about the time that Director General El Baradei was
publishing his conclusions on Iran's noncompliance with its
Safeguard Agreement (and by implication Article III of the NPT),
Iran announced that, in connection with multilateral talks with
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, it would suspend its
uranium enrichment activities and sign an Additional Protocol to its
Safeguards Agreement, granting the IAEA greater inspection
authority over Iran's facilities. 24 Iran further undertook to abide by

a, h, IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/69 (Sept. 12, 2003) (noting with concern Iran's extensive
actions with respect to its nuclear program); IAEA, Implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report of the Director General,
paras. 40-43, IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/63 (Aug. 26, 2003) (reporting previously unknown
Iranian actions related to laser and centrifuge uranium enrichment); IAEA,
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran:
Report of the Director General, paras. 25-26, 32, IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/40 (June 6,
2003) (reporting IAEA discoveries of previously undeclared nuclear activities by Iran).
23.
IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran: Report of the Director General, para. 47, IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/75
(Nov. 10, 2003). See also IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in
the Islamic Republic of Iran: Resolution Adopted by the Board on 26 November 2003,
pmbl., para. f, IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/81, § f (Nov. 26, 2003) (noting that Iran has failed
to meet its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement repeatedly over an extended
period of time).
24.
IAEA, Statement by the Iranian Government and visiting EU Foreign
Ministers,
para.
2(a),
(b)(ii)
(Oct.
23,
2003),
http://www.iaea.org/
NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/statement iran21102003.shtml; see also Staff Report,
IAEA, Iran Signs Additional Protocol on Nuclear Safeguards; Signing Ceremony Takes
Place
at
IAEA
(Dec.
18,
2003),
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/
2003/iranap20031218.html [hereinafter IAEA Staff Report] (reporting that Iran signed
the Additional Protocol to the NPT, which provides for an "expanded declaration of
[Iran's] nuclear activities and grants the Agency broader rights of access to sites in the
country"). In February 1992, the Board of Governors affirmed that the scope of
obligations under NPT safeguards agreements was not limited to nuclear material
declared by a state but included any nuclear material subject to safeguards that should
have been declared. See J. Jennekens, R. Parsick & A. von Baeckmann, Strengthening
the InternationalSafeguards System, IAEA BULL., Jan. 1992, at 6, 6-7 (1992) (stating
that all nuclear material-declared and undeclared-is subject to the IAEA
Safeguards). However, although the IAEA has the legal authority to verify possible
undeclared activities, its ability to discover such activities is limited under the terms of
the Model NPT Safeguards Agreement. Accordingly, between June 1995 and June
1996, the IAEA Secretariat, in consultation with Member States, developed a draft
model protocol for conferring the necessary complementary legal authority on the
Agency to discover undeclared activities. See Richard Hooper, The System of
Strengthened Safeguards, IAEA BULL., Dec. 1997, at 26, 26 (reviewing the history of
the Model Additional Protocol to safeguards agreements). On May 15, 1997 the Board
approved the Model Additional Protocol. See IAEA, Model Protocol Additional to the
Agreements Between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the
Application of Safeguards, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/540 (Corrected) (Sept. 1997) (setting
forth new measures designed to facilitate the implementation of the safeguards). The
Model Additional Protocol is the standard for individual additional protocols concluded
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the terms of the Additional Protocol prior to ratification by the
Iranian Parliament. 25 In the course of events, however, the Iranian
Parliament never ratified the Additional Protocol, and despite Iran's
commitment to abide by its terms prior to ratification, the IAEA
Director General continued to report difficulties with its inspection
efforts due to a lack of Iranian transparency. 26 In August 2005,
following the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran
announced that it would resume uranium enrichment and cease
27
abiding by the terms of the Additional Protocol.
B. Reference to the Security Council (2006)
Iran's resumption of enrichment activities in 2005 and
suspension of adherence to the Additional Protocol caused significant
alarm in the international community and ultimately led to the
decision of the IAEA Board of Governors to refer the matter of "Iran's
many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT
Safeguards Agreement" 28 to the UN Security Council on February 4,
2006.29 Following the IAEA's referral, the Security Council issued a
Presidential Statement on March 29, 2006, calling upon Iran to resuspend uranium enrichment and ratify and implement the
Additional Protocol. 30 Iran, however, did not take these steps. As a
result, on July 31, 2006, the Security Council adopted Resolution
1696, acting under Article 40 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter,
giving Iran a formal deadline of August 31, 2006, to take the required

with States, such as the Additional Protocol signed by Iran in 2003. Id. (foreword to the
Model Additional Protocol).
25.
See IAEA, Statement by the Iranian Government and visiting EU Foreign
Ministers, supra note 24, para. 2(b)(i) (announcing that the Iranian government will
comply with the Additional Protocol in advance of its ratification); IAEA Staff Report,
supra note 24.
26.
See, e.g., IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the
Islamic Republic of Iran: Report of the Director General, paras. 74-76, IAEA Doc.
GOV/2004/11 (Feb.24, 2004) (noting with concern Iran's failure to disclose its
involvement with P-2 centrifuges).
27.
IAEA, Communication Dated 1 August 2005 Received from the Permanent
Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency, at 5, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/648
(AUG. 1, 2005).

28.
IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran: Resolution Adopted by the Board on 24 September 2005, para. 1, IAEA
Doc. GOV/2005/77 (Sept. 24, 2005).
29.
IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran: Resolution Adopted by the Board on 4 February 2006, para. 2, IAEA
Doc. GOV2006/14 (Feb. 4, 2006).
30.
The President of the Security Council, Statement by the President of the
Security Council,
5, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2006/15
(Mar. 29, 2006).
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steps or face further Security Council action, including possible
sanctions. 31 Again, Iran did not comply.

III. THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S SANCTIONS RESOLUTIONS (2006-2009)
Following Iran's refusal to comply with the measures indicated
in Resolution 1696, the UN Security Council subsequently adopted
three sanctions resolutions against Iran, acting pursuant to Article 41
of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 32 The resolutions adopt a classic
carrot and stick approach: On the one hand, the resolutions require
Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing
activities and to resume its cooperation with the IAEA under the
Additional Protocol; on the other hand, the resolutions impose
sanctions designed "to constrain Iran's development of sensitive
technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes." 3 3 So
long as Iran does not take the required steps with regard to its
nuclear program, the sanctions are to remain in place. 34 However, in
the event that Iran complies with the requirements detailed in the
resolutions, the Security Council indicated that the sanctions will be
lifted.3 5 To date, Iran has not complied with the Security Council's
36
resolutions.
The resolutions adopted thus far by the Security Council with
respect to Iran's nuclear program impose so-called "targeted
sanctions" on Iran, aimed at particular types of transactions and

31.
S.C. Res. 1696, 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1696 (July 31, 2006).
32.
S.C. Res. 1803, supra note 8; S.C. Res. 1747, U.N. Doc. SJRES/1747 (Mar.
24, 2007); S.C. Res. 1737, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 27, 2006). On September 27,
2008, the Security Council adopted a further resolution on Iran's nuclear activities,
Resolution 1835. S.C. Res. 1835, T 3-4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1835 (Sept. 27, 2008). This
new resolution, however, does not contain any operative provisions. It simply reaffirms
the Council's commitment to its prior resolutions and Iran's need to comply therewith.
Id.
33.
This language appears in all three of the Council's sanctions resolutions:
S.C. Res. 1803, supra note 8, pmbl., 11; S.C. Res. 1747, supra note 32, pmbl., 7; S.C.
Res. 1737, supra note 32, pmbl., 7 8.
19(c) (providing that if Iran does not
34.
See S.C. Res. 1803, supra note 8,
comply with the resolution, the Security Council will "adopt further appropriate
measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to
persuade Iran to comply with this resolution and the requirements of the IAEA"); S.C.
Res. 1747, supra note 32, 13(c) (using the same language); S.C. Res. 1737, supra note
32, T 24(c) (using the same language).
35.
S.C. Res. 1803, supra note 8, 19; S.C. Res. 1747, supra note 32, 13; S.C.
Res. 1737, supra note 32, T 24.
36.
See IAEA Director General June 2009 Report, supra note 6, paras. 21-22
(outlining various violations of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions
of the above Security Council resolutions); IAEA Director General February 2009
Report, supra note 6, paras. 21-22 (describing continued Iranian non-compliance with
both the NPT Safeguards Agreement and the relevant Security Council resolutions).
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specifically designated persons and entities connected with Iran's
nuclear program. 37 Although news reports indicate that the United
States has sought to have the Council adopt a more comprehensive
ban on transactions with Iran, there has been little support for such
an approach within the Council, at least in part because commercial
entities based in a number of the Council's permanent Member States
have significant interests in Iran that those states do not wish to see
disturbed. 38 As a result, the resolutions do not go so far as to prohibit
all commercial and financial transactions with Iran. Instead, the
resolutions seek to prohibit those transactions which will inure to the
39
benefit of Iran's nuclear program.
In broad brush, Resolutions 1737 and 1747 ban trade with Iran
in designated materials, equipment, goods, and technology that could
contribute to Iran's uranium enrichment or heavy-water reprocessing
activities; 40 require states to freeze the assets of designated entities

37.
On the evolution of the use of targeted or "smart" sanctions in UN collective
security practice generally, see for example, Simon Chesterman & Beatrice Pouligny,
Are Sanctions Meant to Work-The Politics of Creating and Implementing Sanctions
through the United Nations, 9 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 503, 504-10 (2003) (discussing the
design, implementation and termination of U.N. sanctions); Margaret P. Doxey,
Sanctions Through the Looking Glass-The Spectrum of Goals and Achievements, 55
INT'L J. 207, 207-10, 219-23 (2000) (giving historical perspective on the use of U.N.
sanctions).
38.
See, e.g., Christopher Boian, Kremlin Dilemma as Split with US on Iran
Widens, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Apr. 23, 2006 (reporting that Russia is weighing the
costs and benefits of resisting desired U.S. measures against Iran); Coulm Lynch,
Europeans Yield on Iran Sanctions; Concession at U.N. Aimed at Securing Curbs on
Nuclear Trade, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2006, at A24 (reporting that the United States,
Europe, and Russia disagree on an approach to addressing Iran's nuclear ambitions);
China, Russia ConcernedAbout UN Extending Iran Sanctions, Dow JONES INT'L NEWS,
Mar. 9, 2007 (reporting disagreements between Russia, China and the United States
about financial sanctions against companies doing business in Iran).
39.
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 32, 6 (providing that member states
shall prevent the provision to Iran of "financial assistance, investment, brokering or
other services, and the transfer of financial resources or services related to the supply,
sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the prohibited items, materials,equipment, goods
and technology") (emphasis added).
40.
Id.
3-6. The specific technology in which trade is banned is identified in
documents produced by the IAEA. IAEA, Communications Received from Certain
Member States Regarding Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment
and Technology, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1 (Mar. 20, 2006), reprinted in
Letter, Security Council, Letter Dated 13 October 2006 from the Permanent
Representative of France to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the
Security Council, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/2006/814 (Oct. 13, 2006); IAEA, Communications
Received from Certain Member States Regarding Guidelines for Transfers of NuclearRelated Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and Related Technology, IAEA Doc.
INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2 (Mar. 20, 2006), reprinted in Letter, Security Council,
Letter Dated 13 October 2006 from the Permanent Representative of France to the
United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, Annex, U.N. Doc.
S/2006/814 (Oct. 13, 2006). These documents are incorporated by reference into
Resolution 1737.
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and persons related to Iran's nuclear program; 41 and require states to
report on international travel by named Iranians. 4 2 Resolution 1803
bans sales of dual-use items to Iran; 43 bans international travel by
certain named Iranians; 44 and adds persons and entities to the list of
those designated for asset-freezing under Resolutions 1737 and
1747. 45 All of these restrictions are cast as "decisions" of the Security
Council within the meaning of Article 25 of the Charter and thus
create legally binding obligations on the Member States. In the event
of a conflict between the obligations created by the decisions
contained in these resolutions and obligations arising under any
other international agreement, the obligations created pursuant to
46
the resolutions must prevail.
A. The Iran Sanctions Framework
The Iran sanctions resolutions establish a special committee
(Committee) of the Security Council to support implementation, 4 7 a
customary step in UN sanctions practice. All Member States are
obligated to submit a report to the Committee, identifying the steps
that they have taken to implement the Council's decisions. 48 In
addition, the Council has delegated to the Committee the power to:
(a) designate additional materials, equipment, goods, and
49
technology in which trade with Iran should be banned;

41.
S.C. Res. 1747, supra note 32, T 4, Annex I; S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 32,
12, Annex.
42.
S.C. Res. 1737, supranote 32, 10.
43.
S.C. Res. 1803, supranote 8, 8.
44.
Id.
5, Annex II.
45.
Id. 7, Annex I, III.
46.
U.N. Charter art. 103. Whether Article 103 acts to trump obligations
arising out of customary international law is a matter of some dispute. Cf. ZAIM M.
NECATIGIL, THE CYPRUS QUESTION AND THE TURKISH POSITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

127-29 (2d ed. 1993) (arguing that, contrary to the positions of the Greek Cypriot and
Greek governments, a conflict of treaty obligations involving a U.N. Charter provision
does not necessarily invalidate the contradictory treaty statute, but merely raises a
question of priority). Textually, Article 103 only refers to other treaty obligations.
Moreover, there may be limitations on the obligatory character of Security Council
resolutions where those resolutions conflict with peremptory norms of international
law. See, e.g., Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Impact of Peremptory Norms on the
Interpretationand Application of United Nations Security Council Resolutions, 16 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 59, 79 (2005) (arguing that U.N. Security Council resolutions should be
interpreted not to conflict with general international law, particular treaties, or jus
cogens). That issue does not arise in this context.
47.
S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 32, 18.
48.
Id.
19. Compliance with this requirement has not been very good. As of
the end of 2008, two years after the adoption of the first sanctions under Resolution
1737, less than 50% of Member States had submitted the required reports.
49.
Id.
3(d).
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(b) exempt specific transactions from prohibition on the
ground that they will "clearly not contribute" to Iran's
50
nuclear program;
(c) designate additional persons about whose travel States
are required to keep the Committee informed; 51 and
(d) designate additional persons and entities whose assets
52
are to be frozen.
The Iran sanctions resolutions thus reserve to the Security
Council and the Committee the authority to add designations to the
lists of persons and entities to which the Council's sanctions are to
apply. No margin of appreciation or discretion has been left to
Member States by the Council to "self-designate" additional persons
and entities for inclusion in the Council's sanctions regime. Because
the resolutions leave the power to expand the scope of the sanctions
in the hands of the Council and the Committee, states are not legally
able to rely upon those resolutions and the Charter (particularly
Articles 25 and 103) to shield themselves from any legal consequences
which additional measures may have. 53 What this means, in effect, is
that if states wish to take measures against Iranian interests beyond
those provided by the Security Council resolutions, the legal
justification for those measures must come from a source other than
the resolutions.
This conclusion has an important practical consequence. If
states must rely upon a legal basis other than the Council's
resolutions to justify taking additional measures against Iran, they
will need to do so under the law of state responsibility in the form of
countermeasures.
Under the law of state responsibility, the
justification for countermeasures continues for only as long as the
original wrongful conduct persists and reparations have been made;
once those conditions have been met, the countermeasures must
terminate. 54
As discussed below, 55 the most likely basis for

50.
Id.
9.
51.
Id.
10.
52.
Id.
12.
53.
See U.N. Charter art. 25 (requiring Member States to accept and carry out
the decisions of the Security Council); id. art. 103 (requiring that in the event of a
conflict between obligations of a Member State under the U.N. Charter and under any
other international agreement, the obligations of the Charter shall prevail).
54.
See Gab~ikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung.-Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 56-57
(Sept. 25) (holding a party's countermeasure unlawful because it was disproportionate);
Report of the InternationalLaw Commission to the General Assembly, 56 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 10) at 43, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n pt. 2 at 26, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 [hereinafter Draft Articles on
State Responsibility] (providing that "countermeasures may not be taken, and if
already taken must be suspended without undue delay if:(a) the internationally
wrongful act has ceased"). It is also worth noting that countermeasures may in
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countermeasures against Iran would be its non-compliance with its
safeguards obligations under the NPT. However, the obligations
imposed upon Iran by the Security Council resolutions are not
coterminous with its NPT obligations. Under the NPT and its
Safeguards Agreement, Iran has specific obligations of disclosure and
transparency that arise out of those agreements. 56 In contrast, the
Security Council resolutions, although premised upon Iran's failure to
carry out its NPT-based obligations and requiring Iran to bring its
conduct into conformity with those obligations, impose more extensive
obligations, such as additionally requiring Iran to abide by the terms
of the IAEA's Additional Protocol. 57 Because the obligations created
under the NPT are not the same as those created by the Council's
resolutions, it is conceivable that Iran might come into compliance
with its NPT-based obligations but still not be in compliance with the
obligations imposed by the Security Council resolutions. As a result,
whether states are entitled to base additional measures on a broad
reading of the resolutions or must turn to the rules of state
responsibility may have important legal significance for the permitted
duration of such measures.
In this regard, the Common Position adopted by the European
Union on restrictive measures against Iran is particularly
interesting. 58
In that instrument, and in the subsequent EC
Regulation, 59 the European Union broadly has asserted the authority
to freeze the assets of persons and entities not designated in any of
the Security Council resolutions or by the Committee "in order to

principle continue even after the (initial) internationally wrongful act has ceased
because the responsible state has not fulfilled its secondary obligations of reparation-in
effect, a new internationally wrongful act. Id. art. 49, cmt. 8, at 128. However, and
importantly, the continuation of countermeasures in such circumstances may require a
re-adjustment or re-evaluation the countermeasures originally imposed, as the two
wrongful acts (the initial violation and the non compliance with the secondary
obligation of reparation) are not the same, and as such, issues of proportionality may
arise. See infra text accompanying notes 105-08 (discussing the proportionality limits
that international legal doctrine has placed on countermeasures).
55.
See infra Part IV (discussing the availability of unilateral countermeasures
for violations of the NPT-related obligations).
56.
See generally Iran Safeguards Agreement, supranote 3, art. 8(a).
In order to ensure the effective implementation of safeguards under this
Agreement, the Government of Iran shall, in accordance with the provisions set
out in Part II of this Agreement, provide the Agency with information
concerning nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement and
the features of facilities relevant to safeguarding such material.

Id.
57.
S.C. Res. 1737, supranote 32, 1 1, 2, 8.
58.
Council Common Position (EC) No. 2007/140/CFSP of 27 Feb. 2007, art 3,
2007 0. J. (L 61) 49.
59.
Council Regulation 423/2007, pmbl., para. 6, art 7(2), 2007 O.J. (L 103) 1, 1,
4 (EC).
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fulfil the objectives of UNSCR 1737 ...[by] using the same criteria as
those applied by the Security Council or the Committee to identify
the persons or entities concerned. 6 0° It is unclear whether, in taking
this position, the European Union is advancing the view that if it acts
in line with the overall purpose of the Council resolutions, it may
therefore rely upon those resolutions and the Charter to justify its
actions. If so, it is a poor argument. As shown above, the Security
Council resolutions simply do not afford Member States the discretion
to act on the Council's (or Committee's) behalf and make additional
designations of persons or entities for inclusion in the sanctions
regime. 6 1 If states wish to take measures against Iranian interests
beyond those provided by the Security Council resolutions, they must
either have the Council or the Committee make a new designationfor which, incidentally, there are no expressed "criteria" in the
resolutions-or find a legal justification for those measures in a
source other than the resolutions. Indeed, this seems to be the
position taken by the United States. 62 In its submission to the
Committee in May 2008 in connection with Resolution 1803, the
United States encouraged other states to "take actions
complementary to those explicitly required by UNSCR 1803 to
achieve the international community's ultimate objective: inducing a
change in the Iranian regime's nuclear decision-making and strategic
behaviour. '6 3 The U.S. call for "complementary" measures suggests
rather clearly that, on the U.S. view, such measures might only be
taken upon an independent legal basis, not by virtue of states
claiming the right to make additional designations in lieu of the
64
Council or the Committee.

60.
Council Common Position (EC) No. 2007/140/CFSP of 27 Feb. 2007, pmbl.,
para. 10, 2007 O.J. (L 61) 49, 50 (EC). The EU has used this rationale to justify
freezing the assets of Bank Melli, an Iranian bank, on the grounds that it is "providing
or attempting to provide financial support for companies which are involved in or
procure goods for Iran's nuclear and missile programmes." Council Common Position
(EC) No. 2008/652/CFSP of 7 August 2008 amending Common Position 2007/140/CFSP,
Annex II, § B(4), 2008 O.J. (L 163) 43, 68.
61.
See supra text accompanying notes 47-53.
62.
See Letter, Security Council, Letter dated May 2, 2008 from Alejandro
Wolff, Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United
Nations, to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee, Annex, at 2, U.N. Doc.
S/AC.50/2008/34 (May 13, 2008).
63.
Id.
64.
Executive Order 13382 allows the President to freeze the assets of persons
engaged in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and members of their support
networks under the authority granted by the National Emergencies Act and the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act. National Emergency Economic Powers
Act, 3 U.S.C § 301 (West 2009); National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C.S. §§ 1601-1651
(LexisNexis 2009); International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C.S.
§§ 1701-1707 (LexisNexis 2009). See Exec. Order No. 13,382, 70 Fed. Reg. 38,567 (June
28, 2005). Over fifty individuals and entities have had assets frozen under Executive
Order 13382 (authorizing measures to be taken against the property of "Mass
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There is, however, one possible proviso to this analysis. As
drafted and adopted, the resolutions contain a lacuna. Certain
language in Resolution 1737 appears to give states independent
discretion to determine whether transfers of funds to non-designated
entities should nonetheless be prohibited because they may serve to
benefit a designated person or entity. Depending upon how one reads
Resolution 1737, it could confer upon states a wide-ranging, selfassessed power to adopt additional measures against Iran under the
legal aegis of the Security Council current resolutions.
B. The Scope of State Discretion in the Interpretationand
Implementation of Resolution 1737
Paragraph 12 of Resolution 1737 provides in pertinent part that
the Security Council
decides further that all States shall ensure that any funds, financial
assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available
by their nationals or by any persons or entities within their territories,
to or for the benefit of these persons and entities [designated in the
Annex to this Resolution]. 65

Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters"). See KENNETH KATZMAN, IRAN
SANCTIONS ACT 17-19 (Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for Congress Order Code
RS20871, July 9, 2009) (listing the individuals and entities whose assets have been
frozen). Many of these individuals and entities are not designated for sanction under
the Security Council's sanctions resolutions. See, e.g., Patricia McNerney, Acting
Assistant Sec'y for Int'l Secur. & Nonproliferation, U.S. Dep't of State, Jeffrey Feltman,
Principal Deputy Assistant Sec'y for Near E. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, & Adam
Szubin, Dir., Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Treasury Dept., U.S. Dep't of State,
Briefing on a Treasury Designation Under Executive Order 13382 (Sept. 10, 2008),
http://2001-2009.state.gov/tlisn/rls/rml109472.htm (discussing the freezing of assets of
IRISL, Iran's national maritime carrier). Consequently, the legal justification for these
asset freezes cannot rely upon the Council's mandate. As the US Government seems to
acknowledge, legal justification must be found elsewhere, such as in the law of
countermeasures.
65.
The full text of paragraph 12 reads:
Decides that all States shall freeze the funds, other financial assets and
economic resources which are on their territories at the date of adoption of this
resolution or at any time thereafter, that are owned or controlled by the
persons or entities designated in the Annex, as well as those of additional
persons or entities designated by the Security Council or by the Committee as
being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon
deliver systems, or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their
direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit
means, and that the measures in this paragraph shall cease to apply in respect
of such persons or entities if,and at such time as, the Security Council or the
Committee removes them from the Annex, and decides further that all States
shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are
prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any persons or
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The phrase "available ... to or for the benefit of' is ambiguous. The

text does not indicate how directly or indirectly available to or for the
benefit of a designated person or entity a transfer of funds must be to
come within the scope of prohibition. On a narrow reading, only
transactions that are for the direct benefit of a designated person or
entity would come within the prohibited scope. On a broader view,
however, the language of paragraph 12 might be read to prohibit
transactions that indirectly make funds available to or for the benefit
of designated persons or entities. Such a broad interpretation could
have wide-ranging implications. Given the hand-in-glove relationship
between the entities involved in the Iranian nuclear program and the
Government of Iran, any transfer of funds which could be said to
benefit the Government of Iran, such as transactions with Iran's
many state-owned enterprises, might also be said to inure to the
benefit of the Iranian nuclear program. 66 Under a broad reading of

entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of these persons and
entities.
S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 32, 12.
66.
There is little doubt that the structure and character of the Iranian nuclear
program is such that a transfer of funds to the Government of Iran would have the
effect of supporting and benefiting Iran's nuclear efforts. The Iranian nuclear program
is a state-run activity, funded and controlled by the Government of Iran. In many
cases, the relationship between the Government of Iran and the persons and entities
engaged in Iran's nuclear development program is so close as to be essentially
indistinguishable. For example, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran-an entity
designated in Resolution 1737-is in charge of the overarching coordination of Iran's
nuclear program. See, e.g., David Albright, An IranianBomb, BULL.ATOM. SCIENTISTS,
July-Aug. 1995, at 21, 21 (stating that "most reports" put AEOI in charge of the nuclear
program). Not only is the AEOI an Iranian governmental entity, but its president for
twelve years (until July 2009), Gholam Reza Aghazadeh, also served as the VicePresident of Iran. Siavosh Ghazi, Iran Atomic Chief Aghazadeh Resigns, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, July 16, 2009, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/
ALeqM5jq5J8JGyLnup98ptZZmre2pPV64A (reporting on Aghazadeh's resignation and
mentioning his role as Vice President). The new president of the AEOI, Ali Akbar
Salehi, is an appointee of the President of Iran and serves at his pleasure. See Samuel
Ciszuk, Nuclear Chief Replaced by PresidentialAlly in Iran, IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT
DAILY ANALYSIS, July 17, 2009 (reporting that Salehi's appointment will allow the
President's "grip on Iran's nuclear policies [to] tighten"). Similarly, Defense Industries
Organization-another entity designated in Resolution 1737-is responsible for the
production of materials and supply of technical services in support of Iran's missile and
nuclear programs. The Defense Industries Organization is owned and controlled by the
Iranian Ministry of Defense. See S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 32, Annex (listing entities
involved in the nuclear program). See also Islamic Republic of Iran, Defense Industries
Organization, http://www.diomil.ir/en/home.aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 2009) (stating
that the entity is "completely state-owned"). Thus, while a transfer of funds to the
Government of Iran as such would not directly transfer funds to a designated person or
entity under Resolutions 1737, 1747, or 1803, in light of the structure and relation of
those entities to the Government of Iran such a transfer would have the clear effect of
making those funds available to and for the benefit of the organizations involved in
Iran's nuclear program and designated by the Council's resolutions.
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paragraph 12, these transactions might be argued as coming within
the prohibited scope.
1.

The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions

Resolving the interpretive issue raised by the ambiguity in
paragraph 12 raises an important issue about the way in which
resolutions of the Security Council should be interpreted. Unlike the
situation with respect to treaties,6 7 international law has not
developed
rules
of
interpretation
for
instruments
of
68
intergovernmental organizations such as the Council's resolutions.
Although Security Council resolutions have the capacity to affect
legal relationships, they are not treaties. 69 Nevertheless, there would
seem to be no reason why the goal of the interpretive exercise should
be different whether one is interpreting a treaty or a resolution, even
though, as we shall see, the modalities may be different. That goal,
as suggested by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is to
give effect to the textually expressed intentions of the parties, taking
into account the surrounding circumstances-including the context
70
and the object and purpose of the expression.
Much may seem relatively uncontroversial; however, recently
there has been a suggestion, drawing upon considerable theoretical
endeavor, that the differences between treaties and resolutions might

67.
The rules on the interpretation of treaties are generally the same under
both customary international law and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
See, e.g., Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J. Rep. 6, 21-22 (Feb. 3).
68.
There is a growing body of scholarship on the issue. See, e.g., Jochen A.
Frowein, Unilateral Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions-a Threat to
Collective Security?, in VOLKERRECHT - MENSCHENRECHTE - VERFASSUNGSFRAGEN
DEUTSCHLANDS UND EUROPAS: AUSGEWAHLTE SCHRIFTEN 147, 148-49 (Jochen A.
Frowein et al. eds., 2004) (discussing the differences between interpreting resolutions
and treaties); Maarten Bos, The Interpretation of Decisions of International
Organizations, 28 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 1, 11-13 (1981) (discussing how resolutions,
unlike treaties, may be invoked by states not involved in their drafting, and thus
require a different interpretive approach); Michael Byers, The Shifting Foundations of
InternationalLaw: A Decade of Forceful Measures against Iraq, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 21,
26-27 (2003) (discussing contrasting methods of interpretation, and the lack of clear
interpretive rules for resolutions); Efthymios Papastavridis, Interpretationof Security
Council Resolutions Under Chapter VII in the Aftermath of the Iraq Crisis, 56 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 83, 104 (2007) (discussing interpretive methods applied to resolutions);
Michael C. Wood, The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions, 2 MAX PLANCK
Y.B. U.N. L. 73, 74 (1998) (discussing the lack of agreed upon interpretive rules for
resolutions).
69.
Cf. Hugh Thirlway, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of
Justice 1960-1989 (Part Eight), 67 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 29 (1996) (discussing the
difference between resolutions and treaties).
70.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331. See Frowein, supra note 68, at 149; Wood, supra note 68, at 74-75
(discussing the more policy-driven approach to interpreting resolutions when
contrasted with the preferred approach to interpreting treaties).
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reasonably justify a novel approach to the interpretive project. Under
this new "hermeneutic paradigm,"
there should always be consideration not only of what that instrument
[the Council's resolution] purported in concreto, but also, more
generally, of how can the Resolution in hand be construed better, so as
the fundamental purpose of peace maintenance is always accomplished,
on the basis, of course, of the "corporate will" of the Council. Hence,
there should always be a dialogue between the subjective and objective
components, in order to synthesize in better light the ultimate purpose.
To paraphrase Dworkin in this regard, "constructive interpretation" is a
matter of imposing purpose on a Resolution in order to make of it the
best possible example of the form or genre to which is taken to belong,
namely of a Security Council Resolution under Chapter VII of the
Charter.

71

Respectfully, this formulation seems to go too far. While it is one
thing to insist that the interpretation of a Security Council resolution
should recognize that within the Charter system the Council bears
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security (i.e., recognizing the legal context within which Council
resolutions are adopted), it is another thing altogether to suggest that
the interpreter (whoever that might be) may "impose" a meaning
upon the resolution in order to ensure that the Council has
discharged that responsibility in the manner which the interpreter
believes to be the "best" way possible (however that might be
determined). It is not clear what justification there would be for
embracing such a radical approach beyond the assertion that such
constructive interpretation would serve certain normative ends that
are otherwise not met by the processes of political agreement. The
attribution of teleological coherence and aspiration to the formulation
and adoption of the Council's resolutions finds little support in the
muddy realties of international relations or in the business of the
Security Council in particular. 72 Like other organs of the United
Nations, and the international system generally, the annals of the
Council's work unfortunately are filled with far fewer examples of the.
"best" than they are with examples of the "possible" and the "not
possible.17 3 Michael Wood, who spent many years working in the
Council on behalf of the British Foreign & Commonwealth Office, has
observed the following about the way in which the Council operates:
In an ideal world, each resolution would be internally consistent,
consistent with earlier Council action on the same matter, and

71.
Papastavridis, supra note 68, at 104 (citing RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S
EMPIRE 52 (1986)).
72.
Cf. JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 303-09 (1994) (critiquing
Dworkin on coherence grounds).
73.
Cf. SYDNEY D. BAILEY & SAM DAWS, THE PROCEDURE OF THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL 226-27 (3d ed. 1998) (noting that "the problem in the Council for four and a
half decades had not been to prevent great power domination but to bring about great
power agreement," thus limiting the range of possible resolutions).
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consistent with Council action on other matters. Each resolution would
be concise, and avoid superfluous or repetitive material. Consistency
and conciseness are elements of clarity, but the latter also requires,
more generally, the precise and unambiguous use of language. It is, of
course, only possible to use clear language when the policy is clear.
[Security Council resolutions] are frequently not clear, simple, concise
or unambiguous. They are often drafted by non-lawyers, in haste,
under considerable political pressure, and with a view to securing
unanimity within the Council. This latter point is significant since it
often leads to deliberate ambiguity and the addition of superfluous
74
material (presumably thought at the time to be harmless).

These observations should give us substantial pause before
embracing a widely cast interpretive model that seems to place text
and intent in a secondary position to the interpreter's conception of
'75
an undefined "best.
But perhaps it is precisely the failings of the political process
within the Council that justify a departure from ordinary
interpretative principles. In the absence of political consensus in the
Council capable of producing effective action and thereby maintaining
international peace and security, might not it be warranted-or even
necessary-to set aside old attachments to interpretive notions of text
and intent and embrace a principle of muscularly effective
interpretation? We have been down this road before. Particularly in
the aftermath of the efforts to justify the 2003 invasion of Iraq on the
basis of expansive interpretations of Security Council Resolutions 687
and 1441,76 we should view with suspicion interpretative techniques
that would purport to give final position to assertions of the effective
achievement of fundamental purpose. Whether such approaches may
be appropriate in other contexts, such as judicial decision-making, is
beyond the scope of this Article; however, unlike the concerns that

74.
Wood, supra note 68, at 82. On the mechanics of the Security Council's
work and the process of preparing and adopting resolutions, see generally BAILEY &
DAWS, supra note 73 (describing the procedures of the Security Council).
75.
Papastavridis does not acknowledge that intent is likely to be subsumed by
his broad acceptance of a principle of "constructive" interpretation. Indeed, when all is
said and done, his proposal is that the goal of interpretation should be to discern the
"(inter)subjective" intent of the members of the Council (collectively). Papastavridis,
supra note 68, at 105, 112. But that proposal seems critically at odds with his broad
acceptance of a "constructive" theory of interpretation. As Schwarzenberger warned,
with respect to interpretive reliance on purpose, "the functional method is apt to
degenerate into legislation in disguise." 1 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 517 (3d ed. 1957). Were
one to adopt the proposed approach of "constructive interpretation," it seems that the
disguise might be dispensed with altogether.
76.
See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, What Happens Now? The United Nations After
Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 607, 611-14 (2003) (outlining the justifications given at the time
for the 2003 invasion of Iraq); Sean D. Murphy, Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq,
92 GEO. L.J. 173, 178 (2004) (discussing the various rationales given for the 2003 U.S.
invasion of Iraq).
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77
of
may be present with respect to the judicial interpretation
documents like national constitutions or multilateral conventions,
and which may suggest a justification for applying an interpretive
principle of effectiveness, 78 such is not the case with Security Council
resolutions. Only rarely will the meaning of the Council's resolutions
come before an international or national tribunal, and rarer still will
be the occasions when a tribunal will have jurisdiction to determine
whether a State's implementation of a resolution comports with its
legal meaning. Most often the implementation of the Council's
resolutions will be judged by the states to whom it is addressed and
by the Council itself, although it would be overly optimistic to posit
the Council as an effective arbiter of the interpretation of its own
resolutions. 79
As a result, the interpretation of the Council's
resolutions are most likely to be self-judged and disputes about
interpretation resolved as much through political as legal means. In
practice then, regardless of theoretical considerations about the
imposition of an overarching telos in the interpretative enterprise,
international law (and lawyers) should hesitate in the formulation of

77.
Dworkin's thesis in Law's Empire, of course, was concerned with the
judicial process of interpretation. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 410
(1986) (noting that "law is an interpretative concept" and that judges play a very
important role in that interpretation).
78.
In many ways, the hermeneutic of constructive interpretation echoes
certain formulations of the principle of effectiveness sometimes relied upon in the
interpretation of treaties. In its broadest sense, the principle of effectiveness-ut res
magis valeat quam pereat (that the thing may have effect rather than be destroyed )serves as an adjunct to the teleological approach to treaty interpretation and is
formulated as favoring the interpretation that would most effectively fulfill the object
and purpose of a provision or a treaty. As it appears to have been proposed for
application to Security Council resolutions in the passage above, the object and purpose
of the maintenance of international peace and security has been elevated to the level of
grundnorm, "always to be accomplished" by the interpretive exercise. Even in the law
of treaties, however, the principle of effectiveness cannot claim such pride of place. As
the International Court has admonished on various occasions:
"The principle
of... effectiveness, cannot justify the Court in attributing to the provisions ...a
meaning which ... would be contrary to their letter and spirit." Interpretation of Peace
Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania (Second Phase), 1950 I.C.J. 221, 229
(July 18). See Minority Schools in Albania, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. AIB) No. 64, at 20-22
(Apr. 6) (interpreting a provision "both according to its letter and spirit"); Free Zones of
Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (Fr. v. Switz.), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 22, at 13
(Aug. 19) (stating the importance of interpreting terms to enable "the clauses
themselves to have appropriate effects"). Indeed, when the International Law
Commission considered and ultimately decided against expressly including the
principle of effectiveness in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the
Commission observed that insofar as the principle of effectiveness in fact reflects a
general rule of interpretation, it is embodied the provisions of Article 27, which require
"that a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to its terms in the context of the treaty and in the light of its object
and purpose." Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries art. 27(1),
[1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 217, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1.
79.
Cf. Wood, supra note 68 at 78 (stating that the Security Council "is not a
judicial organ").
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doctrine that seems likely to justify self-serving "constructive
interpretations" of the political choices that the Council has made in
°
adopting a resolution phrased in a particular manner.8
An alternative approach to the interpretation of the Council's
resolutions may be found by reference to a principle of restrictive
interpretation. Jochen A. Frowein, for example, has argued that it
may be reasonable to conclude that, as a starting point, a Security
Council resolution, like a treaty, should be interpreted in good faith
in accordance with the ordinary meaning of its terms in their context
and in light of its object and purpose; nevertheless, because
resolutions of the Security Council, unlike treaties, enact duties for
all Member States without their direct participation, Frowein also
recognizes that ambiguities in resolutions should be interpreted
narrowly and against limitations on the sovereignty of the targeted
State.8 1 Whatever one may think of the elevation of state sovereignty
to the position of trump, a cautious approach can be commended on
purely interpretive grounds. Given the process of decision-making in
the Security Council, the text of a resolution will reflect an often
finely balanced political agreement among at least the five permanent
members.8 2 A conservative approach to the resolution of ambiguities
safeguards the interpretative exercise from reading into the text 8of3
the resolution what negotiation and drafting have failed to provide.
Moreover, given the usually self-assessed character of the
interpretation of the Council's resolutions, a restrictive approach may
serve to place constraints on aggressive unilateral interpretation or
at least remove broad and malleable supporting principles (on the
international legal plane) from the consideration of the legitimacy of
such interpretations.
So what are the modalities for interpreting the Council's
resolutions? One might start with the Namibia case, in which the
International Court of Justice stressed four wide-ranging points of
reference to be taken into account in determining the character of the
Council's resolutions: "the terms of the resolution to be interpreted,

80.
Moreover, unlike the judge who cannot choose the cases which comes before
his or her court, the Council passes a great many resolutions and routinely notes in
these resolutions that it "remains seized of the matter," indicating that it may return to
pass additional resolutions on the matter as it empowered to do so under the Charter.
U.N. Charter art. 24. To apply expansive interpretative principles as a legal
justification for circumventing the Council's political process of decision-making on
matters of collective security is a recipe for mischief and worse.
Frowein, supra note 68, at 149.
81.
Cf. BAILEY & DAWS, supra note 73, 137-41, 227-39 (describing the power
82.
held by the permanent members of the Security Council and the influence of their veto
power).
83.
Cf. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (U.K. v. Greece), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A) No. 3, at 19 (Aug. 30) (choosing to adopt the narrower meaning to a term when there
are two equally legitimate interpretations).
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the discussions leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in
general, all the circumstances that might assist in determining the
'8 4
legal consequences of the resolution of the Security Council.
Wood's analysis echoes this broad approach to the evidence relevant
to the interpretive effort, suggesting that in addition to the text of the
resolution itself, there is a need,
when interpreting SCRs, to have particular regard to the background,
both the overall political background and the background of related
Council action; and ...to understand the role of the Council under the
Charter of the United Nations, as well as its working methods and the
way SCRs are drafted. 85

Taken together with the default presumption of restrictive
interpretation, these conceptions of the process by which the Council's
resolutions should be interpreted suggest an approach that eschews
the formal hierarchy of sources found in Articles 31 and 32 of the
Vienna Convention and instead recognizes that while the best
evidence of intended meaning is likely to be found in the words used
by the parties in their instrument, extrinsic evidence may be
necessary to clarify the meaning of that text.
2.

Resolving the Ambiguities in Resolution 1737

How might these considerations apply to the language of
paragraph 12 of Resolution 1737?
On the one hand, both the
language used and the absence of any definition of key terms (e.g.,
"for the benefit of') seem to indicate that paragraph 12 has been
drafted so as to allow implementing states a degree of discretion to
determine when transactions which do not involve the transfer of
funds directly to designated persons or entities nevertheless may be
prohibited pursuant to the Council's authority.8 6 In addition, the
Council's resolutions indicate expressly in the Preamble that the
purpose of the sanctions is "to constrain Iran's development of
sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile
programmes."8 7 Certainly a grant of discretion to Member States to
interpret and apply paragraph 12 broadly would be consistent with
the achievement of this overall aim. On the other hand, however,

84.
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
1971 I.C.J. 16, 53 (June 21).
85
Wood, supra note 68, at 74.
86.
See S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 32,
12 ("[Dlecides further that all States
shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from
being made available by their nationals or by any persons or entities within their
territories, to or for the benefit of these persons and entities.").
87.
This language appears in all three of the Council's sanctions resolutions:
S.C. Res. 1803, supranote 8, pmbl., 11; S.C. Res. 1747, supra note 32, pmbl., 7; S.C.
Res. 1737, supra note 32, pmbl.,
8.
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statements of object and purpose in the perambulatory provisions of a
resolution must be viewed with some caution and understood in the
context of the actual operative parts of the resolution in which they
are made. Statements made in the perambulatory clauses of Security
Council resolutions are often the "dumping ground for proposals that
88
are not acceptable in the operative paragraphs.
Indeed, when the purpose of the sanctions is taken in the context
of the operative provisions of Resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803, it
becomes clear, as noted above, that these are targeted sanctionsaddressed to specific types of transactions and specific persons and
entities.8 9
Notwithstanding broad perambulatory statements of
purpose, the Council has not decided to impose a comprehensive
economic embargo on dealings with Iran. 90
Both the Iranian
Government and (non-designated) Iranian persons and entities
remain free to conduct business (except in a limited class of
transactions), and other states and their persons and entities remain
free to do business with Iran and its nationals. 91 As a result, to
interpret paragraph 12 as granting states discretion to prohibit
broadly any commercial or financial dealings with Iran or its stateowned entities because such dealings may ultimately inure to the
benefit of Iran's nuclear program would undercut the Council's
agreement to impose only sanctions of a limited scope. Furthermore,
if a broad interpretation was correct and any transactions with Iran
or its state-owned entities should be seen as coming within the scope
of paragraph 12's prohibition, it would have the effect of placing any
state that does business with Iran or its state-owned entities in the
position of being in breach of the Council's resolutions. Clearly this is

88.
Wood, supranote 68, at 86-87.
89.
See S.C. Res. 1803, supra note 8,
7, Annex (specifying that new entities
have been added to the list from the previous resolution); S.C. Res. 1747, supra note 32,
4, Annex (noting that new entities have been added to the previous resolution's list);
S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 32, 77 3-5, Annex (specifically listing prohibited actions and
listing persons and entities).
90.
See S.C. Res. 1803, supra note 8,
9 (calling upon states to "exercise
vigilance" when entering into financial agreements with Iran, but not banning them
from doing so outright); S.C. Res. 1747, supra note 32,
10 (welcoming the
commitment to the "development of relations and cooperation with Iran"); S.C. Res.
1737, supra note 32,
13-16, 21 (placing limitations on the actions to be taken
against Iran, and welcoming the commitment to the "development of relations and
cooperation with Iran.").
91.
Prior to the vote in the Security Council adopting Resolution 1737, the
Russian representative stated:
It is crucial that the restrictions being introduced on cooperation with Iran
apply to those areas that are the cause of the IAEA's concern. In that regard,
we firmly believe that cooperation with Iran in areas and using resources that
are not restricted by the draft resolution shall not be subject to the draft
resolution's restrictions.
U.N. SCOR, 61st Sess., 5612th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S[PV.5612 (Dec. 23, 2006).
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not what the members of the Council intended when they adopted
93
Resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803;92 nor is it what they expressed.
Whether the imposition of a more stringent UN sanctions regime
may have been (or would be) a more effective way to effect a change
in Iranian conduct is an open question. As a matter of legal
interpretation, however, the question is beside the point.
In
interpreting these resolutions, the question is not "what would have
been prudent for the Security Council to have decided?" but "what did
the Council decide?" On that basis, the meaning of the resolutions
seems relatively clear: It is for the Security Council itself or the
Committee to make determinations as to which persons and entities
the Council's sanctions will apply. While paragraph 12 leaves some
room for discretion by states, that discretion is narrow and must be
understood within the overall limited structure of the Council's
sanctions regime. Accordingly, in so far as individual states, whether
acting alone or in concert, believe that non-forcible measures should
be taken against Iran in addition to those provided for by the Council,
the legal justification for those measures must be found outside of the
Council's authorization.

IV. THE AVAILABILITY OF UNILATERAL COUNTERMEASURES
FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE

NPT

The limited scope of the Security Council's sanctions resolutions
does not mean that additional reactive measures against Iran by
states acting individually or in concert are foreclosed. Iran's noncompliance with its NPT obligations has its own effects under the law
of state responsibility. In general, non-compliance with existing
international legal obligations is an internationally wrongful act and
provides grounds for other states to invoke the non-complying state's
international responsibility. 94 The difficult question that arises in
the case of non-compliance with multilateral obligations, however, is
whether, and under what circumstances, the response to noncompliance may include the use of unilateral countermeasures.
Ancillary to that question is whether the encouragement of a
supervisory mechanism, like the IAEA, together with action by the

92.
See generally id. (showing the discussion that occurred amongst the
members of the Security Council prior to the adopt of one of the Security Council
resolutions pertaining to Iran's nuclear program).
93.
See sources cited supra note 90 (each noting that there is no outright ban
on states having economic dealings with Iran).
94.
G.A. Res. 56/83, Annex, ch. II, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N.
Doc. AIRes/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001) (defining countermeasures arising from
internationally wrongful acts).
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Security Council, preempts the use of unilateral security measures in
95
any case. These issues are addressed below.
A. The Nature of Countermeasures and Their Legal Limits
It is by now a commonplace observation that in a decentralized
legal system, such as exists in the international community,
mechanisms for the enforcement of international legal norms are at a
premium, particularly in light of the general prohibition on the use of
force. 96 In the absence of a centralized enforcement authority or a
universal mechanism for dispute resolution, countermeasures fill,
albeit imperfectly, a legal lacuna and provide a tool of "self-help" for
97
encouraging compliance with international law.
For the sake of clarity, countermeasures may be defined as nonforcible measures, unilateral in character, taken in response to an
internationally wrongful act that has previously been committed by
the state against whom the countermeasures are addressed and that,
under normal circumstances, would themselves be unlawful as

95.
To be clear, the countermeasures under consideration in this article are
those imposed directly against Iran, such as the freezing of the assets of Iranian
nationals. See supra text accompanying notes 37, 39, 41 (describing the Security
Council resolutions that allow the freezing of the assets of certain Iranian nationals).
Not considered here are measures taken against the nationals of third States with
indirect effect on Iran, such as the "sanctions" authorized under the US Iran Sanctions
Act (ISA). 50 U.S.C.S. §§ 1701-1707 (empowering the President to sanction foreign
entities and persons that make an "investment" of more than $20 million in one year in
Iran's energy sector or that sell to Iran weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technology
or "destabilizing numbers and types" of advanced conventional weapons). The
measures available under the ISA are not countermeasures under the law of state
responsibility as they are directed not against the responsible state itself but third
States. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 54, art. 49(1) (noting that
"an injured State may only take countermeasures against a State which is responsible
for an internationally wrongful act"); id. art. 49(2) ("Countermeasures are limited to
the non-performance for the time being of international obligations of the State taking
the measures towards the responsible State.") (emphasis added). While the
international legality of sanctions such as those authorized by the ISA may be doubted,
full consideration of that question is beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., Vaughan
Lowe, US ExtraterritorialJurisdiction:The Helms Burton and D'Amato Acts, 46 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 378, 379-83 (1997) (discussing the targeted use by the U.S. of sanctions
against certain states to "increase the economic isolation of the targeted countries").
But see Jeffrey A. Meyer, Second Thoughts on Secondary Sanctions, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L
L. 905 (2009) (arguing "that a wide range of secondary sanctions measures are
permissible if tailored to regulate exclusively on 'terrinational' grounds-on the
combined basis of territorial and nationality jurisdiction").
96.
See generally Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Foundations of the Authority of
International Law and the Problem of Enforcement, 19 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1956)
(discussing the difficulties inherent in enforcing international law).
97.
See Gabikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 220-22
(Sept. 25) (recognizing "entitlement to take countermeasures").
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infringing the rules of international law. 98 Although the term
"countermeasures" is of relatively recent coinage, 99 the practice of
states that comes within its rubric is ancient, tracing its roots back to
the practice of forcible "reprisals" and other unilateral actions by
states seeking to enforce rights in their relations with other states. 100
In its earlier incarnation, such unilateral actions were justified by
both the need of a wronged state to reestablish the balance of its
relations with the wrongdoing (responsible) state and by a perceived
moral right to punish the responsible state's delict. 10 1 More recently,
however, the justification of punishment for the wrong has fallen out
of favor. 10 2 Punishment is no longer seen as an acceptable aim for
countermeasures. 10 3 Instead, the justification for countermeasures is
seen as predominantly instrumental: to procure cessation of and
10 4
reparation for the original internationally wrongful act.
Instrumental effectiveness, however, is not a conclusive
consideration in the modern law of countermeasures.
An effective
countermeasure
is not
necessarily
a
legally permissible
countermeasure.
Because the conditions
giving rise to
countermeasures are generally self-assessed-meaning that the state
taking countermeasures will determine for itself whether the
conditions justifying countermeasures exist in law and fact-and are
thereby susceptible to abuse, international legal doctrine has
developed to place limits on the range 1of
countermeasures which are
permissible
in international law. 0 5
Thus, for example,
countermeasures must be proportionate or "commensurate with the
injury suffered,"' 0 6 and certain obligations may not be impaired by

98.
See id. (listing the conditions under which "an injured State" may take
countermeasures). Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 54, art. 49
(explaining when countermeasures are appropriate). On the position of States not
coming within the scope of the ILC Articles' conception of "injured State," see infra
Part lV.C for a discussion of countermeasures by states not suffering direct injury.
99.
See Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946 (U.S. v. Fr.), 18 R. Int'l Arb.
Awards 417, 443 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1980) (discussing "the principle of the legitimacy of
'counter-measures' and the limits on those measures in the light either of the existence
of a machinery of negotiations or of a mechanism of arbitration or judicial settlement").
100.
See generally Michael Akehurst, Reprisals by Third States, 44 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 1 (1970) (discussing the possible justifications of reprisals by third states).
101.
See id. at 2 (quoting authority suggesting that any state, in reaction to a
severe violation of international law, can punish the wrong-doing state).
102.
See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 54, art. 49, cmt. 1
(stating that countermeasures are not a form of punishment).
103. Id.
104. Id. pt. 3, ch. II, cmt. 6, art. 49, cmt. 1.
105.
Id. pt. 3, ch. II, cmt. 2; see Gab6ikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.),
1997 I.C.J. 7, 56-57 (Sept. 25) (listing conditions under which a countermeasure can be
lawful).
106.
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 54, art. 51; Gab~ikovoNagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 56-57 (Sept. 25); Responsibility of
Germany for Damage Caused in the Portuguese Colonies in the South of Africa (Port.
v. Germ.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1013, 1028 (1928); Air Services Agreement of 27
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countermeasures under any circumstances. 10 7
In addition,
countermeasures must, as far as is possible, be reversible: once the
justifying wrongful act has ceased and reparations have been made,
the countermeasures must cease, and the legal relations between the
involved states must return to the status quo ante.1 0 8
B. Countermeasuresand the Concept of the "InjuredState"
The recognition of countermeasures in international law is
controversial. In the International Law Commission (ILC) debates
leading to the adoption of the Articles on State Responsibility in 2001,
there was disagreement as to whether the use of countermeasures
should be recognized in any form.1 0 9 Nevertheless, the final ILC
Articles clearly sanction the use of countermeasures by what the
Articles define as "an injured State."110 The Articles equivocate,
however, with respect to whether or not countermeasures may be
taken by a state that has not suffered a direct injury as a result of the
prior breach: although the Articles do not expressly prohibit the use
of countermeasures by such states, they do not expressly condone
them either. 111 In the situation under consideration here, therefore,
an initial question must be raised: Do breaches of the NPT give rise
to a right in the other parties to that treaty to consider themselves as
"injured States" such that they may clearly resort to countermeasures
in order to encourage compliance, or do breaches of the NPT cause a

March 1946 (U.S. v. Fr.), 18 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 417, 444-45 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1980).
See generally Thomas Franck, On Proportionalityof Countermeasuresin International
Law, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 715 (2008) (providing a more general discussion of the
requirement of proportionality in countermeasures under international law).
107.
DraftArticles on State Responsibility, supranote 54, art. 50.
108.
Id. art. 49(3), art. 49, cmt. 9; see Gab~ikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v.
Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 56-57 (Sept. 25) (listing reversibility as an additional
requirement that a countermeasure must meet).
109.
With respect to the debates, James Crawford, the special rapporteur for the
final stages of the ILC's effort, observed: "Concerns [regarding the provisions on
countermeasures] were expressed at various levels. The most fundamental related to
the very principle of including countermeasures in the text, either at all or in the
context of the implementation of State responsibility." JAMES CRAWFORD, THE
INTERNATIONAL
LAW
COMMISSION'S
ARTICLES
ON
STATE RESPONSIBILITY:
INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 48 (2002). Many of the general arguments
put forward against the recognition of countermeasures are addressed in Yoshiro
Matsui, Countermeasures in the International Legal Order, 37 JAPANESE ANNUAL OF
INT'L L. 1, 6-8 (1994).
110.
DraftArticles on State Responsibility, supra note 54, art. 49.
111.
See id. art. 54.
This chapter does not prejudice the right of any State... to invoke the
responsibility of another State, to take lawful measures against that State to
ensure cessation of the breach and reparation in the interest of the injured
State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached.
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more generalized injury, such that countermeasures are not expressly
sanctioned by the Articles? The answer would seem to lie in Articles
42 and 48 of the Articles on State Responsibility and ultimately in the
character of the NPT itself.112
1.

States Parties as "Injured States" under the NPT

Article 42 sets out three situations in which a state is entitled to
treat itself as being an "injured State" such that the full panoply of
rights of recourse, including countermeasures, are expressly available
to it. 11 3 It is the third category, delimited in Article 42(b)(ii), into
which a breach of the NPT may most obviously be placed. Article
42(b)(ii) provides that a state may treat itself as an "injured State"
where the obligation breached is owed either to a group of states of
which the "injured State" is a part or to the international community
as a whole, and the breach "is of such a character as radically to
change the position of all the other States to which the obligation is
'1 14
owed with respect to the further performance of the obligation."
Article 42(b)(ii) thus echoes the language of Article 60(2)(c) of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, linking the definition of
115
the "injured State" with the concept of interdependent obligations.
Unlike Article 60, however, the establishment of an injury under
Article 42(b)(ii) does not involve the concept of "materiality," nor does

112.
See id. art. 42 (describing the situations in which an "injured state" may
invoke another state's responsibility); id. art. 48 (describing the rights of states other
than the injured state to invoke the responsibilities of the injuring state).
113.
The first is where the obligation breached was owed to that state
individually-such as in the case of a bilateral treaty between two states, or a
multilateral treaty which has the character of being a "bundle of bilateral agreements,"
such as, for example, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Id. art. 42(a).
See also id. art. 42, cmt. 6 (defining "individually" as used in art. 42(a) to "indicatef
that in the circumstances, performance of the obligation was owed to that State"); id.
art. 42, cmt. 8 (adding that 42(a) includes obligations under a multilateral treaty to any
one state in particular). The second situation arises where the obligation breached is
owed to a group of states or the international community as a whole, and the breach is
of such a character so as to "specially affect" the state or states seeking to invoke
responsibility. Id. art. 42(b)(i). In this category, the ILC Comments tell us, come cases
in which wrongful conduct under a multilateral treaty, such as the Law of the Sea
Convention, has particular impact on one or several of the states party to the treaty,
such as, for example, the case in which a coastal state suffers damage from unlawful
pollution. All States Party to the Convention have an interest in seeing that the
provisions on pollution are followed, but the state with pollution on its beaches or in its
fishing grounds is specially affected by the breach. Id. art. 42, cmts. 11-12.
114.
Id. art. 42(b).
115.
See Linos-Alexander Sicilianos, The Classification of Obligations and the
MultilateralDimension of the Relations of InternationalResponsibility, 13 EUR.J. INT'L
L. 1127, 1134-35 (2002) (explaining how Article 42 came to closely mirror the language
of the Vienna Convention).
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it lead to the suspension or termination of the treaty. 116 Instead, an
"injured State" under Article 42(b)(ii) may insist that the responsible
state perform its obligations under the treaty and, further, may seek
to
encourage
that
performance
through
the
use
of
117
countermeasures.
By way of identifying the types of obligations under
contemplation in Article 42(b)(ii), the ILC Comments indicate that
such legal arrangements will include disarmament treaties, nuclear
free zone treaties, "or any other treaty where each party's
performance is effectively conditioned upon and requires the
performance of each of the others." 118 The ILC Comments thus give
strength to the conclusion that a violation of the NPT, as a treaty
akin to a disarmament treaty or a nuclear free zone treaty, 119 should
be considered as putting each other party to the NPT in the position
of an "injured State" and therefore in a position to adopt
countermeasures within the terms of the Articles. 120 Before adopting
that conclusion here, however, one should also consider Article 48,
which addresses the invocation of responsibility by states that do not
qualify as "injured States" under Article 42-and thus do not have
1 21
express sanction under the Articles for the use of countermeasures.
Under Article 48(1), a state not otherwise coming within the
definition of an "injured State" under Article 42 may nevertheless
invoke the responsibility of another state in two situations: "(a) [if]
the obligation breached is owed to a group of States . . . . and is
established for the protection of a collective interest of the group; or
(b) [if] the obligation breached is owed to the international
community as a whole. '122 On its face, subparagraph (a) of Article
48(1) raises some question about whether the NPT might come within
such a description, having been "established for the protection of a

116.
See Special Rapporteur,
324-25, delivered to the
A/CN.4/507/Add.3 (July 18, 2000)
applied to issues of suspension,
countermeasures);

ELISABETH

Third Report on State Responsibility: Addendum,
International Law Commission, U.N. Doc.
(arguing that the Vienna Convention should be
while the Draft Articles should be applied to

ZOLLER,

PEACETIME

UNILATERAL

REMEDIES:

AN

ANALYSIS OF COUNTERMEASURES 89 (1984) (explaining the difference between
suspension, termination, and nonperformance of treaties).
117.
See Karl Zemanek, The Unilateral Enforcement of International
Obligations, 47

ZEITSCHRIFT

FOR

AuSLANDISCHES

OFFENTLICHES

RECHT

UND

VoLKERRECHT 32, 34 (1987) (F.R.G.) (arguing that countermeasures are necessary
because simple retaliatory suspension of a treaty by an injured state generally will not
ensure future performance by the injuring state).
118. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 54, art. 42, cmt. 13.
119. Indeed, the IAEA in its Handbook on Nuclear Law characterizes nuclear
free zone treaties as "regional non-proliferation treaties." CARLTON STOLBER ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, HANDBOOK ON NUCLEAR LAW 122 (2003),

available at http://www-pub.iaea.org[MTCD/publications[PDF/Publ 160_web.pdf.
120. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 54, art. 42, cmt. 13.
121. Id. art. 48(1).
122. Id.
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collective interest of the group," namely, the group of 187 States
Party to the NPT. 123 The official comments to Article 48 do not help
to clarify the issue and actually serve to raise some confusion as to
124
the scope of Article 48(1)(a) as compared to Article 42(b)(ii).
Comment 7 to Article 48 observes that obligations coming within the
scope of collective obligations under Article 48 may include treaties
for the protection of the environment, treaties for the protection of
human rights, or "regional nuclear free zone treaties. '125 Recall, of
course, that in the commentary to Article 42(b)(ii), defining when a
state may invoke the rights of an "injured State," the comments
indicate specifically that the breach of a nuclear free zone treaty may
be considered as giving rise to "injury" by all states that are party to
the treaty. 12 6 This tension is unacknowledged in the Comments and,
thus, once must consider the typology of a breach of the NPT from
first principles.
2.

The Character of the NPT

The object and purpose of the NPT and the structure of the
obligations created under the non-proliferation regime provide the
best indication of whether a breach should be considered to give rise
to an injury in each State Party within the meaning of Article
42(b)(ii). 127 The NPT was crafted as a kind of a "grand bargain"
between Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapon
States (NNWS), 128 resting upon the shared interests of NWS and
NNWS in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the
promise of the availability of peaceful nuclear applications in
NNWS. 129 The main provisions of the NPT concerned with non-

123.
See id. (stating that a state other than the injured state can invoke
responsibility when "the obligation breached is owed to a group of States including that
State, and is established for the protection of a collective interest of the group.").
124.
Compare id. art. 42, cmt. 13 (listing disarmament treaties and nuclear free
zone treaties as agreements within the scope of article 48) with id. art. 48, cmt. 7
(stating that obligations within the scope of Article 48 include "regional nuclear free
zone treaties").
125.
Id.
126.
Id. art. 42, cmt. 13.
127.
See generally Joost Pauwelyn, A Typology of Multilateral Treaty
Obligations:Are WTO ObligationsBilateralor Collective in Nature?, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L.
907 (2003) (discussing the distinction between multilateral obligations of a bilateral
type, which secure individual state interests similar to a contract, and collective
obligations, which pursue a common goal beyond individual state interests).
128.
Article IX(3) of the NPT defines "nuclear-weapon State" as "one which has
manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to
January 1, 1967." Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1,
art. XI(3). Presumably all other States fall into the category "non-nuclear weapon
States," which, although used throughout the Treaty, is never defined.
129.
George Bunn, Horizontal Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION: PROSPECTS FOR CONTROL 34, 36 (Bennett Boskey & Mason Willrich
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proliferation are Articles I, II, and III. Under Article I, NWS
undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices or control over them to anyone whatsoever. 130 NWS also
undertake ifot to assist any NNWS to acquire nuclear weapons or
explosives. 131 Article II contains a complementary undertaking by
NNWS neither to develop, manufacture, or acquire nuclear weapons
or nuclear explosive devices, nor to seek or receive assistance to do
so. 1 3 2 Article III(1) contains an undertaking by NNWS to accept
IAEA safeguards for the purpose of verifying the fulfillment of their
obligation under the NPT not to divert nuclear energy from peaceful
uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 133 Under

eds., 1970). For contemporary accounts of the history of negotiations leading to the
NPT, see generally Edwin Brown Firmage, The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 711 (1969) (providing a contemporary history of
the NPT); Dai Poeliu, Treaty on the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons with Special
Reference to Canada's Position, 6 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 226 (1968) (providing a
contemporary history of the NPT from a Canadian perspective); Mason Willrich, The
Treaty on Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear Technology Confronts World
Politics, 77 YALE L.J. 1447 (1968) (providing a contemporary history of the NPT).
130.

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to
transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices
directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or
induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control
over such weapons or explosive devices.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Treaties, supra note 1, art. I.
131.
Id.
132.

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to
receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or
explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to
seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices.

Id. art. II.
133.

Each Non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to
accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and
concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance
with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the
Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of
the fulfilment [sic] of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a
view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the
safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to
source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced,
processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any
such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied
on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear
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Article 111(4), NNWS undertake to conclude safeguards agreements
with the IAEA to meet the requirements of Article 111.134
Articles IV and V address peaceful applications of nuclear
technology.
Article IV guarantees the "inalienable right" of all
parties to exploit peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the right "to
participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials,
and scientific and technological information." 135 In addition, Article
VI(2) describes a general undertaking to "cooperate in contributing"
to peaceful nuclear development, "especially in the territories of
nonnuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due
13 6
consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world."
Article V creates an obligation and procedure for sharing any
13 7
potential benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions.

activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or
carried out under its control anywhere.
Id. 21 U.S.T. at 487-88, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172.
134.

Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude
agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the
requirements of this Article either individually or together with other
States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic
Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within
180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty.

Id. art. 111(4).
135.
These rights are expressly qualified by the requirement that such activities
be conducted "in conformity with" Articles I and II (pertaining to non-transfer and nonacquisition of nuclear explosives): "Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as
affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research,
production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and
in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty." Id. art. IV(1).
136.

All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right
to participate in. the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials
and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also
cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or
international organizations to the further development of the
applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the
territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due
consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

Id. art V(2).
137.

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to
ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate
international observation and through appropriate international
procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear
explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party
to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such
Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and
exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear weapon
States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits,
pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through
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Finally, Article VI contains an undertaking by the parties to pursue
138
nuclear arms control negotiations "in good faith."
The NPT thus seeks to strike a balance between nuclear "haves"
and "have-nots" by, on the one hand, prohibiting the proliferation of
nuclear weapons and militarized nuclear technology (Articles I and
II) and, on the other, both guaranteeing the right of states to use
nuclear technology peacefully (Article TV) and providing a system for
sharing peaceful technology among States Parties (Article V).
Because peaceful and military uses of nuclear energy derive from
similar technology, however, a key to the successful maintenance of
this balance is that there is a system of safeguards on peaceful
nuclear activities in NNWS to verify that nuclear materials used in
139
such activities are not diverted to use in weapons (Article JII).
"The safeguards system is central to the basic bargain of the
international regime in which other countries are assisted in their
peaceful nuclear energy needs in return for their accepting the
intrusion of safeguards and inspection. 140
A security regime like that established under the NPT depends
upon the shared belief among the parties that the value which they
place on cooperation is shared by the other parties. The NPT depends
upon a system of verifiable non-proliferation in order to foster and
maintain this cooperation. 14 1 "Safeguards are a technical means of

an appropriate international body with adequate representation of
non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall
commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Nonnuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain
such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.
Id. art. V.
138.
"Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in
good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an
early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control." Id. art VI.
139.
This principle is set out in Iran's Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA:
"The objective of the safeguards procedures ... is the timely detection of diversion of
significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the
manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes
unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection." Iran
Safeguards Agreement, supra note 3, art. 28. This language is common to all of the
Agency's NPT safeguard agreements. See Model NPT Safeguards Agreement, supra
note 17, para. 28 ('The Agreement should provide that the objective of safeguards is
the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from
peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons"). See also, e.g.,
IAEA, The Agency's Safeguards System (1965, As ProvisionallyExtended in 1966 and
1968), supra note 16, para. 1 (establishing the purpose of the IAEA's safeguard system:
to promote the peaceful use of atomic energy while preventing military use of atomic
materials).
140.
Joseph S. Nye, Maintaining the Non-ProliferationRegime, 35 INT'L ORG.
15, 17 (1981).
141.
See Roger K. Smith, Explaining the Non-ProliferationRegime: Anomalies
for Contemporary International Relations Theory, 41 INTL ORG. 253, 260 (1987)
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assuring a political end."'1 42 Because the agreement is underpinned
by a collective belief among the parties that cooperative action is
more valuable than "the individualistic pursuit of security, ' 14 3 it is
essential that each state possess not only the right to demand
performance from all other States Party but also the right to take
144
measures to "ensure compliance" with the Treaty's provisions.
Cooperation will not endure for long if states believe that they are no
longer able to rely upon the system established to verify compliance
with the NPT's commitments or if one or more states is able to defect
from the performance of those commitments. 145 This is the essence of
an integrated agreement. Where one state proliferates or where one
state's proliferation status is in question, the benefits of the regime
are lost for all vis-A-vis the proliferating or non-transparent state and
called into question with respect to all others. Each State Party thus
has a direct interest in performance by every other State Party, of not
46
only non-proliferation obligations but also safeguards obligations.'
Only if there is compliance by all will the terms of the bargain be kept
and the conditions of cooperation continue. 14 7 In terms of the law of
state responsibility, then, the NPT is the quintessence of an
agreement that, if breached by one party, gives rise to an injury in
each other party thereto.
C. Countermeasures by States Not Suffering Direct Injury - An
Arguendo Characterizationof the NPT
Although there is good reason to conclude that non-compliance
with NPT obligations should be treated as giving rise to an "injury" in
each State Party within the terms of Article 42, it is useful to also
consider the consequences of the alternative conclusion: whether a

(arguing that a successful security regime requires that all states believe that the other
parties also value security cooperation) (citing Robert Jervis, Security Regimes, in
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 173, 178 (Stephen D. Kasner ed., 1983)).
142.
Jan Priest, IAEA Safeguards and the NPT: Examining Interconnections,
IAEA BULL., Mar. 1995, at 2, 10. See Paul C. Szasz, Sanctions and International
Nuclear Controls, 11 CONN. L. REV. 545, 558 (1979) ("Sophisticated safeguards are
essential to a system that is to control peaceful nuclear activities.").
143.
Smith, supra note 141, at 260 (quoting Robert Jervis, supra note 141, at
176-78).
144.
See id. (arguing that cooperation cannot occur if states fear non-compliance
from other states).
145.
See id. (arguing that cooperation cannot be achieved if states are
"confronted by a defector with strong anti-status quo ambitions").
146.

See GUIDO DEN DEKKER, THE LAW OF ARMS CONTROL: INTERNATIONAL

SUPERVISION AND ENFORCEMENT 351 (2001) (stating that with respect to arms treaties,
every state has an interest in performance by every other state).
147.
See Smith, supra note 141, at 260 (arguing that cooperation cannot occur if
states fear non-compliance from other states).
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non-directly injured state may also take countermeasures against the
wrongdoing state.
Article 54, which concerns responses that may be taken by states
other than the injured state-in other words, states coming under
Article 48-is deliberately ambiguous with regard to the use of
countermeasures by states that have not suffered a direct (i.e., Article
42) injury. Article 54 provides that:
This chapter does not prejudice the right of any State, entitled under
article 48, paragraph 1 to invoke the responsibility of another State, to
take lawful measures against that State to ensure cessation of the
breach and reparation in the interest of the injured State or of the
beneficiaries of the obligation breached.

The ambiguity of Article 54 arises from the use of the term "lawful
measures." Some commentators, generally those opposed to the use
of countermeasures by states that have not suffered a direct injury,
have taken the view that "lawful measures" should be interpreted to
mean that non-directly-injured states may only take measures which
148
are lawful per se (i.e. acts of retorsion, and not countermeasures).
The better view, however, as Sicilianos has shown, is that
countermeasures by Article 48 states are neither sanctioned nor
As the travaux preparatoires
prohibited by the Articles. 149
demonstrate, the particular phrasing of Article 54 reflects the fact
that the ILC could not reach a consensus on countermeasures by
Article 48 states, one way or the other. 150 The matter was simply too
contentious. Consequently, the ILC Comments indicate that the
Commission decided not to advance a position de lege ferenda, but
instead to leave the issue for resolution through the further
development of state practice. 15 1 The ILC took this position despite

See, e.g., Dennis Alland, Countermeasures of General Interest, 13 EUR. J.
148.
INT'L L. 1221, 1232-33 (2002) (arguing that Chapter II has prejudiced the right of
Article 48 states to take "lawful measures" because countermeasures, unlike acts of
retorsion, are inherently wrongful, and can only become lawful when justified by
certain conditions).
Summarizing the argument, Sicilianos notes
149.
that acts of retorsion were explicitly excluded from the scope of application of
the Articles on State Responsibility; that permitting retorsions and devoting a
specific provision to the purpose is pointless, since they are in any case
permitted; that countermeasures too are 'lawful measures,' given that their
wrongfulness is precluded by Article 22-and by customary law-to the extent
that they are taken in accordance with the procedural and material conditions
codified essentially in Articles 49-53; and, finally, that Article 54 is an integral
part of the chapter on countermeasures.
Sicilianos, supra note 115, at 1143.
See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 54, art. 54, cmt. 6
150.
(explaining that the current law on countermeasures in the collective interest is
unsettled).
Id. art. 54, cmt. 6.
151.
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acknowledging the presence of examples in state practice supporting
the recognition of a right for non-directly injured states to take socalled "solidarity" or "collective" countermeasures against a
responsible state. 152 The ILC concluded, however, that this state
practice was too "embryonic" to establish a customary rule.153 Again,
Recent scholarship,
the matter was simply too controversial.
however, has shown that the ILC commentaries seem not to
154
appreciate adequately the extent of state practice on the issue.
A principle reason for the ambivalence within the ILC about the
use of countermeasures by non-directly injured states was the
concern that a conferral of rights under Article 48 could be used to
justify politically motivated acts and could unleash what has been
referred to as 'a sort of international vigilantism,' with States being
wrongly accused of crimes and subjected to damaging measures
without good cause."'1 55 The same concerns apply to countermeasures
taken by directly injured states of course, but as the class of states
which may have legal justification to take countermeasures expands,
so does the possibility that a state might be subjected to
156
countermeasures based upon a spurious legal claim.
Such concerns of misuse are largely ameliorated, however, where
the wrong against which countermeasures are taken is one which has
been declared by a specialized agency with the responsibility for
assessing compliance with the obligation under consideration. With
respect to compliance with the NPT, the IAEA thoroughly fills this
role. 157 The safeguards system created by the NPT includes an
extensive set of procedures that are designed not only to prevent and
158
detect instances of breach of the Treaty's substantive obligations,

152.
See id. art. 54, cmt. 3 (describing the actions taken by states in response to
breaches in obligations to third-parties).
153.
Id. pt. 3, ch. 2, cmt. 8.
154.
Martin Dawidowicz, Public Law Enforcement Without Public Law
Safeguards?An Analysis of State Practiceon Third-Party Countermeasuresand Their
Relationship to the UN Security Council, 77 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 333, 417 (2007).
155.
D. N. Hutchinson, Solidarity and Breaches of Multilateral Treaties, 59
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 151, 202 (1988) (quoting Bruno Simma, International Crimes:
Inquiry and Countermeasures, in

INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF STATE:

A CRITICAL

ANALYSIS OF THE ILC'S DRAFT ARTICLE 19 ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 283, 299 (Joseph
H. Weiler et al. eds., 1989)).
156.
See Jonathan I. Charney, Third State Remedies in InternationalLaw, 10
MICH. J. INT'L L. 57, 101 (1989) (noting that "a substantial expansion of international
law remedies to give third States a significant role.... might erode, rather than
enhance, obedience to the rule of law").
157.
See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, art.
III (stating that the signatories must accept safeguards set forth by the IAEA which
verify the fulfillment of the obligations created under the treaty).
158.
See Model NPT Safeguards Agreement, supra note 17, art. 1 (describing a
model system of safeguards "on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful
nuclear activities ... for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not
diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.").
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but also to provide a mechanism for the determination of
Moreover, violations of the NPT's safeguards
violations. 159
obligations are ascertained through a process which is transparent
and allows the state being assessed the opportunity to be heard and
When the IAEA
to participate in the assessment process. 160
concludes that a breach of NPT safeguards obligations has occurred,
it does so upon the basis of reports provided by the Director General
to the IAEA Board of Governors in which the reasons for that
conclusion are provided to the non-complying state and the factual
predicate is made clear. 161 Thus, the conclusion that there has been
non-compliance with NPT obligations is not based upon the opinion of
one state or an ad hoc group of similarly inclined states but rather
the determination of the IAEA, the agency specifically designated to

159.
For a review of the safeguard process from both a practical and legal
perspective, see Adolf von Baeckmann, The Treaty on the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear
Weapons, in VERIFICATION OF CURRENT DISARMAMENT AND ARMS LIMITATION
AGREEMENTS: WAYS, MEANS AND PRACTICES 167 (Serge Sur ed., 1991).

160.
See id. at 174-75 (describing the process by which violations are
ascertained and the opportunities of the state to participate in this process). Under the
NPT safeguards agreement, the IAEA is obliged to report formally to the state at
specified intervals (usually after each inspection) on the activities carried out at each
facility and their results, including any discrepancies found and whether they have
been resolved. See Model NPT Safeguards Agreement, supra note 17, art. 90(a) (stating
that the Agency will inform the state of the results of any inspection). Accord Iran
Safeguards Agreement, supra note 3, art. 90(a) (noting that "the Agency shall inform
the Government of Iran of: (a) The results of inspections, at intervals to be specified in
the Subsidiary Arrangements"). In addition, the IAEA also provides a statement on
conclusions drawn from its verification activities for each facility over time. Model NPT
Safeguards Agreement, supra note 17, art. 90(b). Accord Iran Safeguards Agreement,
supra note 3, art. 90(b).
The Agency shall inform the Government of Iran of ... (b) The conclusions it
has drawn from its verification activities in Iran, in particular by means of
statements in respect of each material balance area, which shall be made as
soon as possible after a physical inventory has been taken and verified by the
Agency and a material balance has been struck.
Id.
161.
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, supra note 16, art.
XII(C). As the Director of the Agency's Legal Division observed:
The legal basis is designed to obviate political factors which otherwise might
operate within the Agency to delay the establishment of conclusions about
inspection activities. Inspections and the analysis of inspection results are
designed as technical professional operations using objective criteria wherever
possible, and a finding by an inspector of non-compliance with an agreement
would be the end-result of this technical process. An inspector who concludes
that there has been a non-compliance - or that he is unable to verify that there
has been no diversion - has no discretion whether he will take the matter
further: he is obliged to report it to the Director General who, in turn, has no
option but to transmit the report to the Board of Governors.
L.W. Herron, A Lawyer's View of Safeguards and Non-Proliferation,IAEA BULL., Sept.
1982, at 32, 37.
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monitor compliance with safeguards obligations. 162 Indeed, when the
IAEA Board of Governors reaches its conclusion that a violation has
163
occurred, no member may veto that conclusion.
Consequently, countermeasures taken as a consequence of NPT
non-compliance do not raise the same concerns of abusive charges as
might be possible in situations in which states are left to self-judge
the wrongfulness of the acts against which countermeasures are
directed. Indeed, where a multilateral agency like the IAEA has
come to a determination of non-compliance with an international
obligation, the use of countermeasures may serve to strengthen and
reinforce the authority of the agency's conclusions, while at the same
time contributing to the breaching party's willingness to comply with
its obligations.
The law of countermeasures with respect to non-directly injured
states continues to develop. While considerable academic literature
has accumulated on the normative worth of this type of
countermeasure, 164 the ILC has taken the practical position of
leaving it to state practice to guide the law's development in this
area. 165 In these circumstances, states are free to act, but such action
is not likely to be without occasional controversy or questions of
legality.
Undoubtedly, however, the arguments in favor of
countermeasures by non-directly injured states are stronger where
the international wrong giving rise to countermeasures has been
confirmed by a specialized multilateral organization. 1 66 Moreover,
from the point of view of states considering the imposition of
countermeasures, the point may be well taken that where the law is

162.
See Herron, supra note 161, at 37 (stating that it is objective inspectors who
determine whether there has been non-compliance, and that they must report their
findings).
163.
See IAEA, Provisional Rules of Procedure of the LAEA Board of Governors,
R. 35-37, IAEA Doc. GOV/INF/500/Rev. 1 (Feb. 23, 1989) (stating that each governor
on the board shall have one vote and that all decisions shall be made by either a twothirds majority vote or a simple majority vote depending on purpose of the vote).
164.
See, e.g., Akehurst, supra note 100, at 18 (noting that every state is
permitted to prosecute individuals who break the rules of international law and that
"[tlhe exercise of this jurisdiction may be justified on the grounds that every State has
a legal interest in the universal maintenance of rules prohibiting or regulating the use
of force" and implying that it can "be argued that the same legal interest justifies every
State in taking reprisals against States which commit similar crimes"); Dawidowicz,
supra note 154, at 408-18 (arguing that "there is a presumption of legality attached to
the generally uniform conduct" of States that takes countermeasures).
165.
See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 54, art. 54, cmt. 6
(noting the ILC's choice to leave "the resolution of the matter to the further
development of international law").
166.
See Dawidowicz, supra note 154, at 350 (noting the difficulties for potential
sanctioning states in authoritatively assessing whether a violation of international law
has occurred).
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uncertain and the rules are not fixed, the international community's
assessment of the lawfulness of those countermeasures is likely to
reflect political realities more than doctrinal niceties. Thus, when
reinforcing a norm-creating trend in an uncertain area (such as
countermeasures by Article 48 states), it is undoubtedly
advantageous if the state action under scrutiny is seen as
corresponding with the achievement of a generally held substantive
aim of the international community. In that respect, preventing the
unchecked development of nuclear technology in Iran and reinforcing
the process of verification of non-proliferation commitments without
the use of force would appear to satisfy the political, as well as legal,
requirements needed to advance a resolution of the uncertainty left
by Article 54 with respect to the use of countermeasures by "noninjured" states.
D. Summary
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that because of the
character of the NPT, non-compliance with the safeguards obligations
created thereunder should permit each other State Party to treat
itself as an "injured State" under Article 42. As an "injured State,"
each State Party is, in principle, permitted to avail itself of the full
range of responses admitted in the law of state responsibility,
including countermeasures. 1 67 Further, even assuming for the sake
of argument that non-compliance with the safeguards obligations of
the NPT does not lead to the characterization of each State Party as
an injured state, the foregoing analysis further suggests that where a
multilateral agency like the IAEA has come to a determination of
non-compliance with an international obligation, the use of
countermeasures may still be available under the developing law of
state responsibility related to so-called third-party or general interest
countermeasures.
Part IV will now consider whether,
notwithstanding these conclusions, the particularities of the NPT
regime and the UN system of collective security nevertheless require
the conclusion that countermeasures are prohibited.

V. TREATY-BASED LIMITATIONS ON COUNTERMEASURES

The rules of state responsibility, such as those governing the use
of countermeasures, are secondary rules of international law and
accordingly give way in the face of contrary primary obligations. Lex

167.

Draft Articles on State Responsibility,supra note 54, art. 42, cmt. 3.
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specialis derogat legi generali.168 Article 55 of the Articles on State
Responsibility highlights the residual character of the law of state
responsibility by providing that the articles do not apply "where and
to the extent that the conditions for the existence of an
internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation of the
international responsibility of a State are governed by special rules of
international law."'16 9 The NPT-IAEA system includes an elaborate
set of rules that are designed to detect instances of breach of the
Treaty's substantive obligations.
It must be asked, therefore,
whether the presence of such a supervisory mechanism, including a
specialized supervising organization like the IAEA, restricts the
possible use of countermeasures by the States Party to the Treaty.
Secondarily, it must be asked whether the UN Security Council's
activities with respect to Iran's nuclear efforts serve to preempt
unilateral countermeasures by Member States in response to Iran's
non-compliance with the NPT.
A. The NPT and the Concept of "Self-Contained"Regimes
In the Iran Hostages case, 170 the International Court of Justice
referred to the concept of "self-contained" regimes as denoting
situations in which a regime of international law precludes recourse
to mechanisms of enforcement outside of the regime itself. 171 Selfcontained regimes represent an exception to the general principle of
the residual applicability of the law of state responsibility. As such,
self-contained systems cannot lightly be assumed. Indeed, except for
the Court's determination in the Iran Hostages case, finding that the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations was such a self-contained
regime, the Court has not found any other regimes to come within
this category. 17 2
Academic commentators have suggested
occasionally other candidates for inclusion within the rubric, such as
the Treaty of the European Union, 73 but this only tends to reinforce
the view that self-contained regimes are truly rare.

168.
See id. art. 55 (describing the doctrine of lex specialis and stating that it
applies to the Articles on State Responsibility).
169.
Id.
170.
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980
I.C.J. 3 (May 24).
171.
See generally Bruno Simma, Self-Contained Regimes, 16 NETH. Y.B. INT'L
L. 111 (1985) (discussing the origins of the concept in the Iran Hostages case, its
adoption in the Riphagen Reports to the ILC and giving several examples of selfcontained regimes); Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: SelfContained Regimes in InternationalLaw, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 483 (2006) (arguing that
"a fallback on general international law, including resort to countermeasures, may be
justified on normative grounds").
172.
See Simma & Pulkowski, supra note 171, at 21-25 (providing an overview
of cases where the court has declined to find a self-contained regime).
173.
Id. at 21-23.
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The central question in any inquiry as to the self-contained
character of a treaty regime is whether the treaty text either
expressly or by necessary implication restricts the possible use of
174
extra-treaty enforcement mechanisms such as countermeasures.
As a review of the NPT and the related NPT safeguards system
shows, the non-proliferation regime cannot be characterized in this
way.
1.

The Absence of Treaty-Based Enforcement of NPT Obligations

Although the NPT contains numerous undertakings by the
States Party, it includes no mechanism for the enforcement of the
obligations created under the Treaty. Thus, it cannot be said that the
NPT by its terms precludes recourse to mechanisms of enforcement
outside of the treaty itself-indeed, the absence of treaty-based
enforcement mechanisms suggests rather that the parties have
intended to rely for enforcement upon general principles of
international law. 175 The non-proliferation regime may be viewed
more broadly, however, as including not only the obligations created
under the NPT but also those based in the IAEA safeguards system.
Indeed, the conclusion that Iran has breached the NPT is based upon
the idea that by failing to abide by its obligations under its NPT
Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, Iran has concomitantly failed
to abide by its obligations under Article 111(1) of the NPT. The
question thus becomes whether the supervisory mechanisms of the
IAEA framework, which are incorporated into Iran's NPT Safeguard
Agreement, serve to create a treaty-based mechanism for violations of
Article III(1) and thereby preclude recourse to general international
law.
Common with other NPT safeguards agreements, Iran's IAEA
Safeguards Agreement contains no provisions with respect to the
enforcement of the obligations created. 176
NPT safeguards
agreements, however, are not created in a vacuum. Article III(1)
specifically notes that the safeguards agreements required under that

174.

See ANDRE DE HOUGH, OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES AND INTERNATIONAL

CRIMEs 251-52 (1996) (discussing restrictions on countermeasures due to a selfcontained r6gime).
175.
See Hans Blix, Building Confidence, IAEA BULL., Sept. 1984, at 3, 4
(responding to the question "what sanctions do exist in the event of breaches?"). Hans
Blix was Director General of the IAEA from 1981 to 1997. United Nations, Biography
of Dr. Hans Blix, http://www.un.orgIDeptslunmovic/ExecChair/ExeChBi.htm (last
visited Nov. 10, 2009). See D.M. Edwards, InternationalLegal Aspects of Safeguards
and the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 33 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 14 (1984)
(discussing possible sanctions for breach of the NPT). D.M. Edwards was Director of
IAEA Legal Services from 1977 to 1979. Id.
176.
See Iran Safeguards Agreement, supra note 3 (not mentioning enforcement
for violations of the agreement anywhere in the agreement).
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section shall "be negotiated and concluded with the International
Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the
International Atomic Energy Agency."' 77 Even so, the IAEA Statute
provides only minimal procedures for addressing non-compliance. As
set out in Article XII of the IAEA Statute, cases of non-compliance
with nuclear safeguards agreements are to be reported in the first
instance by the IAEA Director General to the IAEA Board of
Governors. 7 8 Upon receipt of a report of non-compliance, the Board
of Governors is required to call upon the non-complying state to
remedy the non-compliance and "report the non-compliance to all
members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the
1 79
United Nations."'
In the event of failure of the non-complying state to take fully
corrective action within a reasonable time, the Board of Governors
may take one or both of the following measures: (1) direct the IAEA to
curtail or suspend any assistance being provided by the Agency, and
call for the return of any materials and equipment made available to
the non-complying state; and (2) suspend the non-complying state
from the exercise of the privileges and rights of membership. 8 0° The
IAEA Statute does not provide for the imposition of any other
sanctions by the Board of Governors.

177.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, art.
III(1).
178.
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, supra note 16, art.
XII(C) ("The inspectors shall report any non-compliance to the Director General who
shall thereupon transmit the report to the Board of Governors.").
179.
Id.
180.
Id. As Goldbat notes, the "sanctions" provided for by Article XII of the IAEA
Statute are very unlikely to deter a non-complying State:
The IAEA provides very little direct assistance to States-and certainly not for
their nuclear power programmes. As regards possible curtailment of assistance
provided by States, such a decision may be adopted by the Board, but it is not
unambiguously mandatory under the IAEA Statute as are decisions of the
United Nations Security Council. Even if all the deliveries of nuclear items
were actually cut off to penalize the offending State, that State might not feel
significantly disadvantaged in a world where no country is exclusively
dependent on nuclear power and where nuclear supply exceeds demand.
Withdrawal of materials and equipment already supplied is not a realistic
measure, because it would require voluntary cooperation of the State being
penalized-which is unlikely. Moreover, return of nuclear supplies may be both
exceedingly expensive and dangerous, and the supplier may be unwilling to
take them back. Suspension of IAEA membership would involve the following:
withdrawing the right to receive agency assistance, which as explained above,
is not an important sanction; barring access to information possessed by the
Agency, which is available to non-members as well; and exclusion from Agency
meetings, which cannot be particularly hurtful.
Jozef Goldblat, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: Assessment and Prospects, in
256 RECEUIL DES COURS, COLLECTED COURSES 9, 43-44 (Academie de Droit
International de la Haye ed., 1995).
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Although the JAEA Statute includes some provisions for
addressing breaches of NPT safeguards agreements, it is difficult to
interpret those provisions to mean that the NPT impliedly includes a
limitation on the rights of States Parties to respond to breaches of the
NPT through the use of countermeasures. 1 81 As a matter of text and
structure, neither the NPT nor the Statute of the IAEA gives the
organs of the IAEA exclusive rights to respond to violations of the
NPT.182 To the contrary, it seems that the non-proliferation system
has rather been designed to allow for the "detect[ion] of possible
breaches of commitments with such promptness that other States
would have time to mobilize the means of inducing respect for the
non-proliferation pledge.' 8 3
While it is true that the final
assessment of compliance with safeguards obligations made by the
IAEA Board of Governors, as the supervising body for the NPT's
safeguards agreements, should be considered legally binding on all
States Parties (and bar them from maintaining individually that no
violation has taken place), it does not follow from this that the NPTIAEA process defines the scope of actions that may be taken by each
State Party individually in reaction to the Board of Governors'
assessment.
B. The Relationship between Security Council Action
under Chapter VII and UnilateralCountermeasures
During the ILC's debates on the role of countermeasures in the
law of state responsibility, Allain Pellet put forward the view that in
the event that the Security Council decided to impose sanctions in
response to an internationally wrongful act, the right of individual
states to take unilateral countermeasures would terminate. 8 4 Pellet

181.
See DEN DEKKER, supra note 146, at 349 (stating that arms control treaties
are not self-contained and therefore do no limit sanctions otherwise available to States
Party).
182.
See id. at 347 (noting that no arms control treaties provide a supervising
organization the exclusive right of responding to a violation).
183.
Blix, supra note 175, at 3.
184.
Summary Records of the Meetings of the 44th Session, [1992] 1 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n 144, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/SER.A/1992 ("If the Security Council had decided on
measures within the meaning of Articles 41 and 42, States were no longer free to
decide as they wished on countermeasures of their own."). Others have offered similar
arguments. See, e.g., Domingo Acevedo, The US Measures Against Argentina Resulting
from the Malvinas Conflict, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 323, 343-44 (1984).
Second, economic coercion attempted by one or more states with the intention
of forcing another state to adopt a particular course of action against its willand interest if not justified by the principle of individual or collective self
defense, or by special treaty provisions and then authorized by a competent
organ such as the Security Council or the contracting parties of the GATT,
should be regarded prima facie as impermissible under international law.
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based his argument on an analogy to Article 51 of the Charter, which
stipulates that the right of self-defense in response to an armed
attack shall not be impaired until the Security Council has taken
185
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
So too should it be with countermeasures, Pellet argued, where the
Security Council has adopted measures pursuant to Articles 41 and
42.186 If Pellet's view is accepted, then recourse to countermeasures
against Iran would be preempted by the sanctions regime adopted by
the Security Council in Resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803.
There are reasons to doubt the soundness of Pellet's argument.
In the first place, the analogy to Article 51 and the use of force seems
inapt. Article 51 is a unique article, addressing an exception to the
Charter's otherwise total prohibition on the use of force in Article
2(4).187 By contrast, there is no corresponding prohibition in the
Charter on the rights of Member States to take countermeasures
under general international law and no corresponding limitation on
the rights of Member States to continue taking countermeasures once
the Security Council has acted. Reference to Article 51, therefore, is
something of a non-sequitur, dealing with the framework for the use
of force (which has no textual parallel with respect to the use of
countermeasures).
Secondly, nothing in the Charter's structure or terms suggests
that there is an implied limitation on the rights of Member States to
take lawful countermeasures where the Security Council has acted.
Neither the Charter taken as a whole nor those provisions addressed
to the role of the Security Council in particular suggest that the
Security Council's exercise of its Chapter VII powers additionally acts
18 8
to displace the application of the law of state responsibility.

Robert Ago,

Obligations Erga

Omnes

and the International Community, in

INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF STATE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ILC's DRAFT ARTICLE

19 ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 155, at 237, 238-39 ("It is not all States, but
rather the international community that is envisaged as the possible bearer of a right
of reaction to this particularly serious form of internationally wrongful act."); Bernhard
Graefrath, International Crimes-A Specific Regime of InternationalResponsibility of
States and Its Legal Consequences, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF STATE: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE ILC's DRAFT ARTICLE 19 ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 155, at
161, 167 (arguing that "sanctions of States not directly affected by the crime depend on
a decision of the Security Council"); K. Sachariew, State Responsibility for Multilateral
Treaty Violations:Identifying the 'InjuredState' and Its Legal Status, 35 NETH. INT'L L.

REV. 273, 283-84 (1988) (arguing that "the application of countermeasures is rebilateralized at the enforcement stage").
185.
U.N. Charter art. 51; Summary Records of the Meetings of the 44th Session,
supranote 184, at 143-45 (noting Pellet's argument).
186.
Summary Records of the Meetings of the 44th Session, supra note 184, at
143-44.
187.
See LINOS-ALEXANDER SICILIANOS, LES REACTIONS DECENTRALISEES
L'ILLICITE: DES CONTRE-MESURES A LA LEGITIME DEFENSE (1990) (Fr.).

A

188.
Karel Wellens, The UN Security Council and New Threats to the Peace:
Back to the Future, 8 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 15, 50 (2003) (citing Giorgio Gaja,
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Implied limitations on the rights of states under the Charter, such as
Pellet proposed, should be viewed with the keenest scrutiny lest
"textual implication" be allowed to mask simple policy preferences.
Long ago, in the Certain Expenses of the United Nations advisory
opinion, the International Court of Justice cautioned against reading
into the Charter provisions unsupported by the text:
These purposes [of the Charter] are broad indeed, but neither they nor
the powers conferred to effectuate them are unlimited. Save as they
have entrusted the Organization with the attainment of these common
189
ends, the Member States retain their freedom of action.

Moreover, Pellet's argument is not supported by state practice.
As Martin Davidowicz's recent study has shown, there is a now
substantial body of state practice accepting the imposition of
countermeasures in situations either where the Security Council has
become seized of a matter but not decided to impose sanctions under
Article 41 or where the Security Council has decided to impose a
regime of sanctions but the state's countermeasures go beyond what
the Council has authorized:
the United States against
response to the invasion of
though the Security Council
matter and decided not to

*

1950: countermeasures by
China and North Korea in
South Korea; adopted even
had become seized of the
impose sanctions. 190

0

1982: countermeasures against Argentina by Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, and EC Member States in
response to the invasion of the Falklands/Malvinas
islands; adopted even though the Security Council had
become seized of the matter and decided not to impose
sanctions. 191

*

1986: countermeasures by the United States against
South Africa in response to apartheid regime; scope of US
countermeasures exceeded the scope of sanctions already
192
imposed by the Council.

*

1983: countermeasures by Finland, France, Germany,
Spain, and Switzerland against the Soviet Union in
response to the downing of Korean Airlines Flight 007;

R~flexions sur le r6le du Conseil de S6curitj dans le nouvel ordre mondial. A propos des
rapportsentre maintien de la paix et crimes internationauxdes Etats, 98 REV. GEN. DE
DROIT INT'L PUBLIC 297, 298 (1993) (Fr.)).
Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151,
189.
168 (July 20).
See Dawidowicz, supranote 154, at 351.
190.
191.
Id. at 368-70.
192.
Id. at 376-78.
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adopted while the Security Council was in the process of
1 93
considering the matter and despite Soviet veto.
*

1996: countermeasures by Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda,
Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, and Zambia against Burundi in
response to political repression; adopted despite a decision
194
by the Security Council not to impose sanctions.

*

1997: countermeasures by the United States against
Sudan in response to grave violations of human rights;
scope of US countermeasures exceeded the scope of
195
sanctions already imposed by the Council.

*

1998: countermeasures by EC Member States against
Yugoslavia in response to grave violations of human
rights; scope of EC countermeasures exceeded the scope of
196
sanctions already imposed by the Council.

To this list might be added the recent example of Japan's imposition
of a variety of countermeasures against North Korea in 2006,
19 7
following North Korea's test launch of missiles in the Sea of Japan.
Those countermeasures were imposed prior to the Security Council's
decision to adopt limited sanctions against North Korea on July 15,
2006,198 and Japan maintained those measures and increased their
strength even after the Council had acted. 199 No protest was raised
with respect to this practice.
While the foregoing suggests strongly that there is no
incompatibility in either doctrine or state practice with the resort to
countermeasures even in situations in which the Council is seized of
the matter, this general freedom to take countermeasures is subject
to an important caveat. Undoubtedly, the Security Council, in the
exercise of its Chapter VII powers in a particular situation, has the
power to take decisions prohibiting or limiting the imposition of

193.
Id. at 374-75.
194.
Id. at 389-90.
195.
Id. at 391.
196.
Id. at 393.
197.
See Press Release, Embassy of Japan, Chief Cabinet Secretary's Statement
2nd Statement after the Launch (July 5, 2006), http:lwww.us.emb-japan.go.jp/
englishlhtmllpressreleases/2006/CCS2.htm (noting the Government of Japan's decision
to "to take stringent measures in response" to recent missile tests by North Korea). I
am grateful to Antonios Tzanakopoulos for bringing this example to my attention.
198.
See Sec. Res. 1695,
3-4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1695 (July 15, 2006) (requiring
Member States to "prevent missile and missile-related items, materials, goods and
technology being transferred to DPRK's missile or WMD programmes" and "prevent
the procurement of missiles or missile related-items, materials, goods and technology
from the DPRK, and the transfer of any financial resources in relation to DPRK's
missile or WMD programmes").
199.
Mari Yamaguchi, Japan Ramps up Sanctions Against NKorea for Rocket,
ABC NEWS, Apr. 10, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=7304233.
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countermeasures by Member States where, for instance, the Council
determines that unilateral countermeasures would be a hindrance to
collective efforts. 200 That, however, is not the situation here, as the
resolutions under consideration impose no such prohibition or
limitation.

VI. CONCLUSION

The concerns raised by Iran's nuclear program and its
unwillingness to comply with its non-proliferation obligations remain
at the time of this writing. As the international community considers
what additional steps may be taken to persuade Iran to alter its
conduct, the issue of non-forcible coercive measures has been raised.
Under the circumstances, the possibility of states taking non-forcible
countermeasures against Iran raises a number of important
questions and concerns implicating the legal relationship between the
UN system of collective security and the rights of states to take
unilateral measures under the law of state responsibility, the
discretion afforded to Member States in the interpretation and
implementation of Security Council resolutions, the availability of
countermeasures for the violation of multilateral obligations, and the
exclusivity of the Chapter VII framework for collective security.
Applying the foregoing analysis, it seems that states have little
discretionary authority to interpret the provisions authorizing
sanctions in the Security Council's resolutions with respect to Iran.
Nevertheless, even in the absence of Security Council authorization,
states retain their rights under the law of state responsibility to take
measures in response to wrongful acts. Viewed through the lens of
the ILC's Articles on State Responsibility, the character of the NPT
entitles each State Party to treat itself as an "injured State" for the
purposes of determining its rights with respect to a responsible state.
Under the ILC's Articles, countermeasures are an accepted means of
response by an "injured State."
Moreover, even if we assume for the purposes of argument that
the NPT ought not be characterized so as to place each State Party in
the position of an "injured State" according to the ILC's conception,
each State Party should still be entitled to resort to countermeasures
in accordance with the emerging state practice suggesting the
crystallization of a recognition of the right of states to take collective
countermeasures. This entitlement is at its strongest where, as in

200.

See Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, Article 39 of the ILC First-Reading Draft

Articles on State Responsibility, 83 RMSTA DI DIRTTrO INTERNAZIONALE 747, 763 n.29

(2000) (Italy) (noting the "Security Council's tendency to act as legislator or judge" in
actions by Member States).
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the case of Iran, the internationally wrongful conduct has been
determined by an international body with responsibility for
monitoring and verifying compliance with the obligations in question.
In such instances, the use of countermeasures in response to
violations-far from undermining the international order-may serve
to promote respect for the international rule of law. As Giorgio Gaja
has noted: "Were States not even allowed to adopt countermeasures
rather protects the
...one would probably have to conclude that20law
1
infringement of those [community] interests."

201.
Giorgio Gaja, Obligations Erga Omnes, International Crimes and Jus
Cogens: A Tentative Analysis of Three Related Concepts, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF
STATE:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ILC's DRAFT ARTICLE 19 ON STATE
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 155, at 151, 155-56.

